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7.3. INVESTMENT1 
Overall Summary:   
Regulatory and institutional reforms encouraged by CETA may remove certain barriers in Canada 
to EU investment; however, as the negotiations remain ongoing, this assessment is based on a 
set of assumptions. Removal of barriers could create certain net economic benefits. It would 
likely create some positive, and potentially negative, social impacts. It would likely have mixed 
environmental impacts. 
Regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) specifically, the conflicting costs and benefits 
of such a mechanism make it doubtful that its inclusion in CETA would create a net/overall 
(economic, social and environmental) sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. There is 
no solid evidence to suggest that ISDS will maximise economic benefits in CETA beyond simply 
serving as one form of an enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is also 
an enforcement mechanism. And the policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA, 
while less significant than foreseen by some parties, would be enough to cast doubt on its 
contribution to net sustainability benefits. As such, the study’s assessment suggests that a well-
crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement 
mechanism in CETA than ISDS. 
Economic assessment summary:  
The impact of CETA as a whole specifically on investment, as well as the impact of the 
Investment Chapter specifically on trade and intangible business linkages, could contribute to 
some increase in GDP growth in Canada and the EU.  
More specifically, the impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada and the EU will likely 
be positive, and could be ‘notable,’ although in the opinion of the study would likely be less than 
‘significant.’ For Canada, investment liberalisation in CETA is expected to reinforce existing 
trends in bilateral investment, with the majority of flows directed towards the financial, energy 
and mining sectors. More specifically, if included in the negotiations, removal of restrictions in 
such sub-sectors as telecom; transportation services, including water and transportation 
services; fisheries; finance; and mining/uranium may positively impact the level of bilateral 
investment in such areas. Investment in the EU would likely follow the positive trend predicted 
for Canada, but on a smaller scale. This is due to the relatively larger size of the EU economy 
compared to Canada and given Canada is currently more restricted to FDI than the EU at large.  
The Investment Chapter in CETA could encourage economic benefits in Canada in terms of trade-
related effects and intangible linkages, although the significance of these will likely be minor to 
notable at most. The Investment Chapter in CETA would provide benefits to multinational 
                                                             
1 Introductory notes: “Investment” herein follows the definition used in NAFTA – specifically, all types of financial 
investments, shareholding, secured debts and typical forms of FDI. The below assessment delineates between 
portfolio investments and FDI where appropriate. Unlike the other cross-cutting issue sections herein, this section 
considers both the US and Mexico alongside the assessment for the EU and Canada, in recognition of the linkages 
between CETA and NAFTA, and the EU-Mexico FTA and CETA. Although the analysis focuses on investment arising out 
of an “Investment” chapter in CETA, particularly in reference to investor-state provisions, it also considers investment 
effects from CETA as a whole. This investment section, (as well as the analysis of investment-related indicators within 
the individual sectoral analyses), is partially informed by the FDI gravity modelling results found in Annex 3.  
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companies in particular in terms of fostering intangible business relationships, which may have 
economic benefits, and stimulating the flows of capital and differentiated goods.  
However, the role of ISDS, which may be included in the Investment Chapter in CETA, as a 
contributor to the aforementioned economic benefits is unclear as there does not appear to be 
readily available empirical evidence on the matter. On one hand, simply to the extent that it 
serves as an enforcement mechanism, the inclusion of ISDS in CETA may contribute to some 
economic benefits, and the economic risks it brings are unlikely to be as significant as some 
stakeholders suggest. On the other hand, it is uncertain that the aforementioned economic 
benefits from ISDS would be maximised in a sustainable way, and the fact remains that ISDS 
does usually create at least some minimal economic costs to government.  
The Investment Chapter in CETA will create requirements that on one hand will likely have 
positive economic effects, while on the other hand may also create effects that constitute a 
reduction in economic policy space. 
Social assessment summary 
There will likely be some positive, and potentially some negative, social impacts from investment 
encouraged under CETA as whole. Increased investment under CETA might be channelled into 
creating jobs in Canada and the EU that score higher on quality and decency of work indicators, 
although it may also create some degree of worker displacement and wage inequality. Either 
way, these impacts would likely be relatively limited. The impacts related to CETA-encouraged 
investment flows would not be attributable solely to the Investment Chapter but to the combined 
impacts of a number of provisions in CETA, for example those relating to other cross-cutting 
issues described herein, those liberalising restrictions in services (inclusive of those not related 
directly to investment), and those creating tariff reductions. 
The policy space reductions caused by ISDS allowances in CETA would likely be less significant 
than foreseen by some, but still enough to cast doubt as to if they would contribute to 
net/overall social sustainability in Canada and the EU. (This said, it should be kept in mind that 
the state legally maintains the right to regulate in the face of an ISDS mechanism, although it 
may have to pay compensation in ISDS cases and feel dissuaded from regulating for fear of ISDS 
cases; and it is important to stress that a reduction in “policy space” as used in this assessment 
exclusively refers to the ability of governments to make policies that have clear social [as well as 
economic and environmental] benefits.) This assessment is based upon consideration of several 
arguments: the questionable utility of using ISDS as currently operating rather than domestic 
courts in Canada and the EU; precedent of ISDS creating some regulatory chill; risk of unrecorded 
regulatory chill from ISDS; lack of information on ISDS case rulings; and risk created by a ‘third 
country incorporation’ provision in ISDS in CETA. This brings into question the efficacy of ISDS in 
contributing to protection of investors’ rights premised on objectives of preventing capital flight 
and enhancing investment with the end goal of contributing to the “the well-being of society.” 
Likewise, it is doubtful that including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall social sustainability 
benefit for the EU and/or Canada. 
Environmental assessment summary 
As mentioned in the Industrial Products section, increased FDI in the oil sands and mining sectors 
could lead to increased environmental impacts since these sectors are environmentally intensive. 
Given the relative concentration of FDI inflows in these sectors in Canada, a marginal increase in 
investment inflows driven by CETA and higher oil and mineral prices could lead to an increase in 
production capacity that would in turn lead to impacts on capital stocks, use of bio-diverse areas, 
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water use and contamination, toxic contaminants and effluents, and air pollution and GHG 
emissions. This said, although the gravity modelling for this report provides some indication that 
investment could increase, it is unclear how much CETA would increase investment in the oil 
sands and mining sectors, and if investment does not particularly increase then the directly 
related environmental impacts therein would clearly be lessened. 
On the other hand, increased investment under CETA might have some positive environmental 
impacts. In particular, some investment might gravitate towards green technology, producing 
positive impacts in Canada and the EU.  
This analysis errs on the side of caution by assuming that, while not meeting the threshold of 
‘significant,’ ISDS in NAFTA, as well as some EU BITs, may very well have created some 
magnitude of reductions in environmental policy space relevant to this SIA, and thus ISDS in CETA 
may have some negative environmental impacts on the EU and Canada. It is therefore doubtful 
that including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall environmental sustainability benefit for 
the EU and/or Canada.  
 
7.3.1. EU, Canada, USA and Mexico 
BASELINE  
FDI and portfolio flows 
Canada 
Canadian direct investment abroad has rapidly expanded in the past 30 years, and Canadian 
firms now own more foreign operations in terms of dollar value than foreign companies own in 
Canada.2 Outward stocks of FDI stood at $522,069 million in 2009, representing an increase of 
66% since 2000.3 Of this stock, the EU was the second largest destination for Canadian outward 
investment with 25.1% of the total, representing an increase of 4.1 percentage points from 2000 
figures. In 2009, the total stocks of investment in Canada amounted to $483,472 million.  
In terms of sectoral investment, the largest recipients of outward Canadian FDI are the finance 
and insurance industry (50.3% of all outward FDI stocks) and the energy and metallic minerals 
industry (23.3%). The average annual FDI inflow from 1994-2009 from the Canada to the EU was 
$CAD 8,189.4 
The average annual FDI inflow from 1994-2009 from the US to Canada was $CAD 12,337, and 
the average annual FDI inflow during the same period from the EU to Canada was $CAD 8,813.5 
The EU serves as the second largest source of inward FDI in Canada, contributing 29.8% of the 
total stocks in 2009. Herein, the UK is the single largest contributor, holding 11.6% of the total 
stock of foreign investment in Canada, followed by the Netherlands (8.5%), France (3.3%), 
Germany (2.5%) and Luxembourg (1.8%). Overall, these countries respectively represent the 2nd, 
3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th largest sources of investment into Canada in 2009. In terms of sectoral 
investment, inward FDI is primarily directed towards Canada’s energy and metallic minerals 
industry (36.2%) and finance and insurance industry (19.8%). Within the former, the EU, led by 
                                                             
2 Institute for Research on Public Policy. “Dispelling Myths about Canadian Foreign Direct Investment.”  Canada. 
3 Statistics Canada 
4 Constructed average from Statistics Canada data 
5 Ibid 
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the UK, holds 35.2% of all inward FDI in the sector, while in the latter the EU holds 34.8% of all 
inward FDI.6 
At the end of 2007, the market value of Canadian portfolio investment abroad totalled 
$714,734.7 million consisting of $564,138.4 million in stocks and $150,596.4 million in debt 
instruments. Herein, the EU served as the second largest destination of Canadian portfolio 
investment with holdings of $201,318.6 million. Within the EU, the largest destinations were the 
UK (33.4% of all EU holdings), France (14.8%), Germany (15.1%) and the Netherlands (7.4%).7  
EU 
In 2009, outward investment from the EU totalled $366,727 million, with the main outflows 
originating from Luxembourg,8 the UK and France. The largest destinations for outward FDI in 
2006 were the US, Canada and Switzerland. Inward investment totalled $309,557 million, with 
the aforementioned countries also serving as the main sources of investment.  
In terms of portfolio investment, Euro area holdings of foreign securities totalled EUR 3.8 trillion 
at the end of 2008, with holdings of US securities at 33% of the total and offshore financial 
centres 12%.9 
US and Mexico 
The US is the world’s largest recipient of FDI. More than $325.3 billion in FDI flowed into the US 
in 2008, which is a 37 percent increase from 2007.10 The $2.3 trillion stock of FDI in the US at the 
end of 2008 is the equivalent of approximately 16 percent of US GDP.11 Canada is the largest 
source of inward investment with inflows of $25, 813 million in 2009 followed by France with 
$24,046 million and Germany with $16,210 million. In total, financial inflows from the EU were 
$83,725 million. The US also has the world’s largest outward investments. Outward flows 
totalled more than $3.2 trillion in 2009.12  In 2009, the largest recipients of US FDI were the 
Netherlands ($471,567 million), the UK ($471,384 million) and Canada ($259,792 million). In 
total, outflows to the EU were more than $1,976 billion.13 
FDI in Mexico for 2009 was $11.6 billion, down 51% from the previous year. The US was the 
largest foreign investor in Mexico, accounting for 49.8% ($5.8 billion FDI from the US) of 
reported FDI. The economic slowdown in the US in 2008 and 2009 has caused a significant 
decline in this figure. The Mexican Government estimate of FDI for 2010 is $15 billion to $20 
billion.14 
Regulatory and institutional framework 
Canada and EU  
International investment agreements (“IIAs”) serve as the legal basis for international 
investment cooperation. There are several types of IIAs. These include Bilateral Investment 
                                                             
6 Statistics Canada 
7 Statistics Canada 
8 The role of Luxembourg in investment is primarily explained by its role in financial intermediation 
9 European Central Bank 
10 US Dept. Of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
11 CIA World Factbook 
12 CIA World Factbook 
13 US Dept. Of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
14 US Department of State 
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Treaties (BITs)/Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs); double 
taxation treaties (DTTs); hybrid bilateral trade and investment agreements like CETA, often 
called preferential free trade and investment agreements (PTIAs); regional trade and investment 
agreements, some of which may be  PTIAs, like NAFTA; regional economic integration 
agreements; and other multilateral agreements involving foreign investment, for example, 
sectoral investment agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty. According to UNCTAD, as of 
2005 there were over 2,400 BITs, 2,600 DDTs, and many PTIAs, regional economic integration 
agreements, and other multilateral agreements involving foreign investment worldwide.15 
The investment environment in Canada and the EU (including EU MS) is governed by a variety of 
domestic and international rules. Certain EU MS have particularly well developed domestic 
regulatory and institutional environments for FDI and portfolio flows. Both Canada and the EU, 
as members of the WTO, are bound by WTO agreements including GATS and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Matters (TRIMS).  
Canada and the EU have a number of trade and economic agreements with foreign countries, 
many of which include provisions on investment. A listing of these agreements for can be found 
in the Tables 72 and 73 in the “Third Countries” section below.   
Additionally, Canada and the EU each have a range of investment-specific agreements with 
other nations. Canada’s FIPAs with third countries are listed in a Table 74 in the “Third 
Countries” analysis below.16 EU MS have concluded 1,200 BITs with other countries.17 BITs 
typically include provisions defining standards of treatment, protection from expropriation, the 
right to freely transfer capital, prohibitions on certain performance requirements, and investor-
state dispute settlement.18 Under Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), the new name of the EU Treaty as written under the Treaty of Lisbon, 
FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial policy. The EU now has the exclusive 
competence to abolish barriers to foreign direct investment, whereas previously Member State 
BITs protected EU investors (market access was already an EU competence). 
Canada and EU MS have undertaken a number of measures to facilitate investment among one 
another specifically. Canada has FIPAs with 6 EU MS: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Canada and EU MS have made commitments through the OECD 
to one another to mutually facilitate investment, including via the OECD Code for Liberalisation 
of Capital Markets and Code for the Liberalisation of Invisible Operations and the Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. These commitments do not include investment protection provisions, 
                                                             
15 UNCTAD (2005). “Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties: A Review.” UNCTAD Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development. New York and Geneva. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf 
16 Canadian FIPAs contain the following major components: 1. Definitions; 2. Treatment of Investments - General and 
Specific Obligations; 3. Protection of investments - Expropriation, Compensation, and Transfers; 4. Subrogation (this is 
an insurance term, used for situations where the insurer has the rights of its insured after it makes an insurance 
payment) 5. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms; 6. Entry Into Force; 7. Exceptions and Special Provisions. More on the 
structure of FIPAs can be found at URL: http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article497 
17 EC (2010). “Memorandum 10/303: Q&A: Commission launches comprehensive European international investment 
policy.” 7 July 2010. 
18 Gallagher, Kevin P (2010), “Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment 
Agreements.” G-24 Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD. 
  8 
such as expropriation and investor-to-state dispute settlement. The OECD National Treatment 
Instrument is a non-binding agreement. The 2008 Joint Study suggests that no Canadian 
provinces and territories have arrangements with EU MS on Canadian Direct Investment Abroad 
(CDIA) outside of the informal mechanisms set up by Ontario. Regional businesses and 
commerce groups importantly facilitate commerce and trade between the EU and Canada.19  
Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
The US has a particularly well developed investment environment, and Mexico has an 
investment environment that has seen marked improvement and transformation over the last 
few decades. The US has one of the most developed systems for FDI and portfolio flows in the 
world. Mexico has a well-established environment for investment with the US and Canada under 
NAFTA, and with the EU under the EU-Mexico FTA which entered into force in 2000. More than 
18,000 companies with US investment have operations in Mexico, and the US accounts for more 
than 40% of all FDI there.20 However, Mexico opted out of making commitments for investment 
in its energy sector under NAFTA, which has ultimately hurt Mexico.21 
As mentioned, the important investment relationship between Canada, the US and Mexico is 
governed by NAFTA. Box 33 below summarises certain key provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 
which deals specifically with investment. 
 
Box 33: Select provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA 
 Article 1102 of NAFTA requires national treatment in investments between NAFTA 
countries. Sub-article 2 (Article 1102:2) applies to investors and investments in “like 
circumstances,” which may allow for difference in interpretation when considering the 
applicability of different sized companies and/or investments in different sectors. (Note: 
As stipulated by Article 1108, Article 1102 does not apply to government procurement; 
subsidies or grants; nor does it apply to measures that relate to aboriginal affairs, 
minority affairs or social services such as health, child care and social welfare.) 
 Article 1103 of NAFTA requires all concessions in investment be extended to investors 
from the US and Mexico in what is known as a most favoured nation (MFN) clause. Sub-
article 2 (Article 1103:2), like Article 1102:2, applies to investors and investments in “like 
circumstances,” which may allow for difference in interpretation when considering the 
applicability of different sized companies and/or investments in different sectors. (Note: 
As stipulated by Article 1108, Article 1103 does not apply to government procurement, 
subsidies or grants.) 
 Article 1105 of NAFTA requires members to observe minimum standards within 
“international law.” 
 Article 1106 on NAFTA prohibits performance requirements in terms of export quantity 
                                                             
19 2008 Joint Study 
20 US Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm 
21 Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott. (2005) 
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requirements, domestic content, and technology transfer, among other requirements. 
 Article 1110 of NAFTA states that “No Party may…take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment…” except under certain 
circumstances.22  
Certain provisions herein have been used as the basis for private investors to sue the state over 
claims that the government limited their investment opportunities/their rights have been 
violated under the agreement. These are so called “investor-state” provisions, which form the 
basis for what is called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Article 1102, 1105 and 1110 
have been frequently used in this regard. 
The application of Chapter 11 is limited by sectoral, reciprocal and investment review 
reservations listed in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of NAFTA.23 
NAFTA allows companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 







INDICATOR: Impact on institutional and regulatory environment for investment (focus on FDI) 
Canada and EU 
FDI restrictions and liberalisation 
The OECD has compiled an FDI Restrictiveness Index which is useful at a basic level to assess the 
investment climate in Canada and the EU (and the US and Mexico). The index uses 4 categories 
of restrictions against investment, i.e. equity restrictions, screening and prior approval 
requirements, restrictions on key foreign personnel/directors, and an “other restrictions” 
category.25 It calculates scores for several sectors and weights the sector scores (using FDI/trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 Article 1110 of NAFTA states: “No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an 
investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with 
due process of law and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 1105; and (d) upon payment of 
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6.” 
23 For example, Canada carried over 48 sectoral reservations from CUFSTA under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Hufbauer, G.C. 
and J.J. Schott (2005), pg 202) 
24 See Dumberry, P. (2001). “The NAFTA Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law: 
Journal of World Investments.” 151-95; and Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J Schott (2005), pg 206 footnote 22 
25 The OECD defines the 2010 index components as follows: (1) foreign equity limits (no foreign equity allowed, 
foreign equity allowed to be less than 50% of total equity, foreign equity is allowed to be greater than 50% but less 
than 100% of total equity); (2) screening and prior approval (approval required for new FDI/acquisitions of less than 
USD 100million or if corresponding to less than a 50% of total equity, approval required for new FDI/acquisitions 
above USD 100 million or if corresponding to over a 50% of total equity, notification with discretionary element); (3) 
restrictions on key foreign personnel/directors (foreign key personnel not permitted, economic needs test for 
employment of foreign key personnel, time bound limit on employment of foreign key personnel, 
nationality/residence requirements for board of directors – majority must be nationals, at least one must be a 
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weights)26 to create an overall country score. The index is not without its flaws, including that it 
does not take into account important determinates of investment including barriers posed by 
state-owned enterprises and semi-private government enterprises or special government 
rights,27 or stringency of enforcement and application of rules. Still, the 2010 Index has made 
some revisions to past methodologies,28 and is useful in providing a basic understanding of the 
dynamics of the institutional and regulatory investment environments in Canada and the EU 
(and the US and Mexico).  














 Austria   0.058 0.009 0 0.009 0.076 
 Belgium   0.014 0 0 0.002 0.016 
 Czech Rep.   0.049 0 0 0.006 0.055 
 Denmark   0.063 0 0 0.001 0.063 
 Estonia   0.052 0 0 0.046 0.098 
 Finland   0.019 0 0 0.021 0.04 
 France   0.038 0 0.001 0.014 0.053 
 Germany   0.02 0 0 0.004 0.025 
 Greece   0.032 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.059 
 Ireland   0.035 0 0 0.024 0.059 
 Italy   0.069 0 0 0.004 0.073 
 Hungary   0.065 0 0 0.001 0.066 
Latvia 0.051 0 0 0.034 0.085 
 Lithuania   0.036 0 0 0.014 0.05 
 Luxembourg   0.003 0 0 0 0.004 
 Netherlands   0.003 0 0 0.001 0.004 
 Poland   0.058 0 0 0.053 0.111 
 Portugal   0.003 0 0 0.003 0.006 
 Romania   0.008 0 0 0 0.008 
 Slovak Rep.   0.049 0 0 0 0.049 
 Slovenia   0.011 0 0 0 0.012 
 Spain   0.019 0 0 0 0.019 
 Sweden   0.028 0.027 0 0.001 0.057 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
national); (4) “other restrictions” (establishment of branches not allowed/local incorporation required; reciprocity 
requirement; restrictions on profit/capital repatriation; access to local finance;  acquisition of land for business 
purposes; land ownership not permitted but leases possible) 
26 See Golub (2003) for explanation of weighting methodology 
27 Mandel-Campbell. A. (2008)  
28 For example, the 2010 methodology expands upon previous coverage for sectors and re-weights certain 
components. 
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 UK   0.036 0 0 0.022 0.059 
EU (24) 
Average 
0.034 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.048 
 
*OECD 2010 FDI Restrictiveness Index does not provide data for Malta, Cypress, and Bulgaria 
Source: Data compiled from: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
As can be seen in the above table (although not accounting for Malta, Bulgaria or Cypress given 
lack of data), the EU overall has a relatively low FDI restrictiveness index of 0.048 out of 1. 
Members with the highest investment restrictiveness include Poland and Estonia. Members with 
the least restrictive index include the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
 
Table 64: OECD 2010 FDI restrictive index for Canada, EU (24)*, US and Mexico (0 = most open, 









Canada 0.067 0.082 0.000 0.005 0.153 
EU (24)* 0.034 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.048 
US 0.100 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.116 
Mexico 0.131 0.095 0.000 0.037 0.264 
*OECD 2010 FDI Restrictiveness Index does not provide data for Malta, Cypress, and Bulgaria 
Source: Data compiled from: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
As can be seen in the above Table 64, Canada has a more restrictive investment environment 
than the US or EU24, although less restrictive than Mexico. As is evidenced in Table 64, Canada’s 
most significant restrictions to FDI are in the media and fishing sectors. It is least restrictive in 
the agricultural and forestry as well as real estate sector. Still, the full impact of this 
restrictiveness on the grand scheme of investment flows should be contextualised, as the 
Canadian Competition Panel among others have noted Canada does attract noteworthy 
amounts of FDI. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP its stock of inbound FDI is relatively high among 
developed countries.29 Canada experienced a significant change in its OECD FDI restrictiveness in 
the last 4 years, as in 2006 its FDI restrictiveness index score was about 0.35930 making its 2010 
score of 0.153 roughly 53% lower, although it is unclear how much of this is due to a reduction 
in restrictiveness or a result of changes to the OECD restrictiveness index methodology between 






                                                             
29 Competition Review Panel. Compete to Win. Ottawa: Government of Canada. 2008.  
30 Data from: Blanka Kalinova, Angel Palerm and Stephen Thomsen (2010), “OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 
Update”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2010/3, OECD Investment Division, 
www.oecd.org/daf/investment 
31 See Ibid at pg 7 which makes a note on comparing 2006 vs. 2010 FDI restrictiveness indexes 
  12 
Table 65: Canada’s 2010 OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index by sector32 (0= most open, 1 = most 
closed) 
Sector Canada’s FDI restrictiveness  index 
Agri. & For.  0 
Fishing  0.6 
Mining  0.15 
Manuf.  0.1 
Electricity  0.1 
Construction  0.1 
Distribution  0.1 
Hotels & res.  0.1 
Transport  0.267 
Media  0.7 
Telecom  0.35 
Financial Serv. 0.067 
Business Serv.  0.1 
Real Estate  0 
Total FDI Index                                      0.153 
Source: Kalinova, B., A. Palerm and S. Thomsen (2010) 
 
Table 66: Canada’s 2006 OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index by sector (0= most open, 1 = most 
closed) 
Sector Canada’s FDI restrictiveness  index 
Business service (total) 0.175 
Legal  0.200 
Accounting  0.200 
Architecture  0.150 
Engineering  0.150 
Telecoms (total)  0.525 
Fixed  0.525 
Mobile  0.525 
                                                             
32 The OECD offers the following further description of what some of the sectors herein include: Business services 
(legal services, accounting and audit, architectural services, and  engineering services); other finance (including 
securities and commodities brokerage, fund management, custodial services, etc.); telecommunications (fixed 
telecoms, mobile telecoms); media (radio and TV broadcasting, other [newspapers, etc.]); transport (land, maritime, 
air); electricity (general distribution); food and other manufacturing (including textiles, wood, paper and publishing, 
other manufacturing); mining and quarrying (including oil exploration and drilling)   
Notes: (1) The score for Financial Services has been calculated on the basis of a National Treatment instrument. 
Canada’s position under the Codes of Liberalisation in the area of financial services is discussed in the July 2009 
Report by the Investment Committee to the OECD Council (www.oecd.org/daf/investment/instruments).  
(2) The scores for Fishing, Maritime Transport, Media and Telecoms have been calculated on the basis of Canada's list 
of exceptions under the National Treatment instrument. The corresponding sectoral reservations under the Capital 
Movements Code are under review by Canada. 
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Construction 0.150 
Distribution 0.150 
Finance (total) 0.219 
Insurance 0.200 
Banking 0.225 







Total FDI Index                                      0.228 
Source: Koyama, T. and S. Golub (2006) 
 
CETA may not reduce any current investment barriers in the EU to a significant degree given the 
EU’s already comparatively low level of investment restrictiveness. The impact of this reality on 
FDI flows is discussed under the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator(s) below. This is not to 
deny that CETA may encourage some reductions on investment barriers in EU MS with higher 
investment restrictiveness.33  
 Regulatory and institutional reforms encouraged by CETA may remove certain barriers in 
Canada to EU investment; however, without further details of the agreement it is difficult to tell 
exactly what barriers may be removed. Also, without further details, it is difficult to tell if these 
barriers will be removed specifically because of the CETA negotiation process or were in the 
process of being liberalised anyway.   
It is also worth noting that CETA may affect restrictions in the inter-provincial investment in 
Canada. Requirements on administrative processing of paperwork that must be completed and 
submitted to agencies at different levels of government acts as an impediment to investment. 
Lack of harmonisation can also lead to delays in zoning, licensing and permit requirements. CETA 
may prioritise reduction of at least some of these internal barriers to investment in Canada, 
which are of concern to EU companies operating in Canada as well as to domestic Canadian 
companies. 
Enforcement provisions in investment and trade & investment agreements 
Logic behind using investor-state provisions in investment and trade & investment agreements 
Investor-state provisions are included in investment (e.g. BITs) and trade & investment 
agreements (like NAFTA) as the basis for ISDS, i.e. for private investors to sue the state in 
international arbitration over claims that the government limited their investment 
opportunities/their rights have been violated under the agreement. They deal with disputes 
over property rights and other treatment of investments. A brief overview of commonly invoked 
                                                             
33 Note that although Poland has a more restrictive FDI environment than Estonia according to the OECD index, 
Poland has signed an FIPA with Canada, implying that its FDI restrictiveness with Canada would be comparatively 
lower than it is with the RoW under the OECD index. 
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investor-state clauses from NAFTA, found in Chapter 11 of that agreement, can be found in Box 
33 of the baseline section. The remainder of this analysis considers investor-state provisions in 
CETA that would likely be worded in a broadly similar manner to those in NAFTA Chapter 11. 
It is important to note that investor-state provisions are not unique to NAFTA or (if included) to 
CETA; however, while EU MS have many BITs with investor-state provisions the EC has not 
included investor-state provisions in an EU-wide trade & investment agreement with third 
countries. CETA would be a first in this regard.34 Such provisions are very common in IIAs signed 
all over the world over the past decade or so, and it is now more unusual to have such an 
agreement without their inclusion.35 Cases are often heard by the World Bank’s ICSID; the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, according to UNCITRAL rules; or the International Court of 
Arbitration in Paris, an arm of the International Chamber of Commerce. As noted by UNCTAD, 
the UN agency dealing specifically with trade, the increase in investor-state disputes usually 
arises as increased international investment flows lead to more occasions for such disputes, and 
more occasions for disputes taken together with more IIAs are likely to lead to more cases. Also, 
with increased numbers of investment agreements in place, more investor-state disputes are 
likely to be within the realm of ISDS. Another reason for the increase may be the increased 
complexity of recent IIAs and other regulatory hurdles in their actual implementation. 
Additionally, as investors hear about successful claims, more investors may be encouraged to 
use the mechanism.36 
Advocates of ISDS, and BITs at large, argue that these provide added security to investors, which 
ultimately creates economic benefits for society. Specifically, as ISDS is undisputedly intended as 
a core mechanism for protecting investors’ rights, it intuitively should also contribute to the 
wider stated objectives of its advocates in protecting such rights, i.e. preventing capital flight 
and maintaining investment, “enhancing”/increasing investment, and through these actions 
contributing to the “the well-being of society.”37 For example, advocates say investor-state 
dispute settlement prevents capital flight in the event of a problem with investment. Also, there 
is a related rationale for including investor-state provisions in an agreement like CETA because 
“Investor-state is such an established feature of investment agreements that its absence would 
in fact discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive than others.”38  
                                                             
34 Sinclair, S. (April 2010), pg 15 
35 A database of BITs can be found at UNCTAD’s website here: 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx 
36 UNCTAD (2005)   
37 Trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 suggest investor state provisions may increase 
investment (consultations with EC trade negotiations, February 2011). The EC finds in EC (2010c) “Memorandum...” 
page 1 that “Investors are not the only beneficiaries of investment agreements. Investment, being an important driver 
for economic and social development, equally benefits all stakeholders. Thus, protection of investors' rights is not an 
aim in itself, but serves a wider objective: to enhance investment and contribute to the well-being of society.”  In 
another publication the EC finds that “Investor-state dispute settlement, which forms a key part of the inheritance 
that the Union receives from Member State BITs, is important as an investment involves the establishment of a long-
term relationship with the host state which cannot be easily diverted to another market in the event of a problem with 
the investment.” (EC (2010d). “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards a comprehensive European 
international investment policy.” COM 343 final. 7.7. 2010, pgs 9-10) 
38 Ibid, confirmed by consultations with DG Trade investment and service negotiators, March 2011. Also, 
aforementioned consultations specifically suggest that EU and/or Canadian investment might be diverted to a country 
like China if not protected by ISDS in CETA. And it was inferred that this investment loss could be compounded if 
China were to sign an agreement with ISDS with Canada, for example, if CETA did not include ISDS. In response, it 
must first be recognised a wide variety of pull factors unrelated to any push factors in CETA exist in China which make 
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The implications of these objectives for CETA are discussed further in the “FDI and portfolio 
flows…” indicator section, below.  
Investor-state allowances vs. domestic law and domestic adjudication 
As with any binding commitment, investor-state provisions require enforcement mechanisms 
since without a mechanism of enforcement investment commitments have relatively little 
meaning. However, some suggest that tribunals, at least as currently operating, are not 
necessarily the most appropriate institutional settings in which to hear investment-specific 
cases. Gus Van Harten of Osgoode Hall Law School suggests tribunals are “fragmented and non-
hierarchical adjudicative structure of investor-state arbitration.” He suggests that investor-state 
tribunals have in the past “been more likely to base damages awards on violations of the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment, in particular, than expropriation provisions in 
investment treaties.” Further, he says “…governments are not acting responsibly to the public 
purse if they assume, when passing a measure, that future tribunals will favour a state-friendly 
as opposed to an investor-state interpretation.” 39 Also, some draw attention to the apparent 
inability to challenge cases heard under ICSID rules.40 These concerns extend to ISDS under 
CETA, as it appears to be on track to use the same method of tribunal arbitration. Others may 
disagree with the aforementioned assessment, finding that international tribunals provide an 
environment to hear cases that is in fact less bias than domestic courts in certain countries. And 
some sources emphasis that the ICSID Convention, for example, does not override domestic 
laws relating to sovereign immunity from the awards process, and arbitration decisions can be 
annulled or revised on review.41  
 
More specifically, the utility of ISDS between developed countries in particular can be 
questioned, for example between the EU and Canada under CETA, given the strength of their 
existing institutional environments. Herein, a commonly held viewpoint from some opponents 
of investor-state provisions in agreements between countries like the US and Canada, i.e. those 
developed countries in NAFTA, is that investors from countries with well developed legal 
systems for hearing disputes will “abuse” such provisions in an effort to challenge government 
regulation.42 As a note, when involving developing countries, investor-state arbitration is also 
not without its flaws, and in fact may be sometimes disproportionately burdensome on these 
countries,43 although, at least theoretically, on the other hand these countries might benefit 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
it a highly attractive market to EU and Canadian investment. (And Canada’s resource endowements in particular, not 
the prospect of ISDS, make Canada attractive to Chinese investors.) Second, while China has more recently included 
certain ISDS provisions in investment agreements, for example in its latest BIT with Germany, no recorded ISDS case 
has ever been brought against China to date. It is likely that this trend is explained in that foreign businesses might 
feel they would jeopardise their operations in China if bringing an ISDS case, and in fact one reason for ISDS being 
allowed in recent Chinese investment agreements is likely the flexibility in the scope of what is committed and the 
fact that such allowances could practically be more so to protect Chinese interests abroad than vice versa (see 
Prud’homme, Dan (2011) “Recent ISDS trends in investment agreements with China.” Working Paper.) 
39 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
40 Allen & Overy LLP (2010). “Investment Treaty Arbitration: Protecting and Promoting Foreign Investments.” 
http://www.allenovery.com/AOWeb/binaries/51290.pdf 
41 EIU (2010). “Evaluating a potential US-China bilateral investment treaty.” EIU report for the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission. EIU, London. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2010/EIU_Report_on_US-
China_BIT--FINAL_14_April_2010.pdf 
42 See Public Citizen. http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2309 
43 On one hand, the relationship between developed and developing countries in particular might best be protected 
by such arbitration given the often underdeveloped nature the dispute settlement institutions within developing 
countries. For example, a number of studies discuss the utility of ISDS where investors are concerned about the 
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more from ISDS if they in fact bring investor security that exists comparatively more in 
developed countries. 
Box 34: treatment of firms from third countries under certain ISDS 
provisions 
 
NAFTA allows companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 
11 case (hereafter sometimes referred to as the ‘third country incorporation provision’).  
 
As a note, the application of this provision may be somewhat limited by provisions included in 
NAFTA to protect against “treaty shopping,” a situation where investors search for home 
countries that have treaties with host countries where investments will be made. The potential 
for such treaty shopping was recognised in the drafting of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which includes 
a provision allowing a party to deny the benefits of the agreement to investors that have no 
“substantial business activities” in their putative home country.44  
 
Without further details of CETA it is unclear how the agreement might address the 
aforementioned issues. The implications of including the third country incorporation provision in 
CETA are discussed further in the “Cost of ISDS…” and “Policy space” indicators sections, below. 
 
 
Certain government officials consulted have pointed out that NAFTA Chapter 11 cases brought 
under NAFTA tribunals could instead be brought to domestic courts under domestic law 
(regardless of the existence of NAFTA), and this would also apply to CETA.45 This point is further 
analysed below. 
NAFTA allows a wider breadth of recourse than in domestic law in allowing a private foreign 
individual to challenge a foreign government, for example in certain circumstances depending 
on the related commitments in terms of MFN, national treatment, minimum standards of 
treatment, monopolies and state enterprises, performance requirements, requirements on 
senior management and board of directors, among others. These provisions deal with treatment 
of companies along a relatively specific set of commitments.    
                                                                                                                                                                                     
strength of domestic reforms implemented in countries with higher perceived risk and/or corruption, i.e. usually 
certain developing countries (for example, see Vandevelde, K. (1998). “Investment Liberalization and Economic 
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties”. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law). On the other hand, 
it is interesting to note that the NAFTA experience suggests that there is no clear evidence of more ISDS being 
initiated against developing countries than developed countries, as 28 cases were brought against Canada whereas 
only 17 cases were brought against Mexico (a developing and emerging country as defined by the IMF, although a 
member of the OECD). This said, trends in NAFTA alone cannot be extrapolated to assessing the ISDS relationship 
between all developed countries and developing countries, and further analysis is warranted in this area.  
Monetary payouts, combined with the clear concerns raised by UN panels over the impacts of investor-state 
provisions on developing countries in particular -- among others see UNCTAD (2007) and other groups, for example, 
Osogoode Law School (2010) – suggest a need for improved arbitration of investor-state cases or dramatic changes in 
the system, for example moving towards contract-based approaches to ensure investment rather than IIAs. To take 
an example from NAFTA even, Mexico has been compelled to pay over $187 million in damages under NAFTA (data 
from Sinclair (October 2010)). This is the highest amount of damages paid by any NAFTA country, and clearly has 
higher monetary burden on the Mexican government than it would on the US or Canada given its comparatively 
smaller budget.  
44 Article 1113.2. For further discussion on this issue see UNCTAD (2005)   
45 Consultations with trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 
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Moreover, NAFTA provisions related to “expropriation” go beyond domestic law on the same 
subject (also called “takings law”). Domestic law in NAFTA countries requires compensation for 
direct expropriation, which under a simplified definition is when the government takes over 
property rights. In NAFTA, for example, provisions allowing protection of expropriation are 
worded in a rather unique way: allowing protection against acts “tantamount to expropriation” 
and wider indirect expropriation. These provisions have been applied more liberally than US 
domestic takings law in terms of “diminution of value,” “conceptual severance,” “police power” 
and the “ripeness rule.” 46 The US takings law is known to be more complex than Canadian 
takings law. As such, a CETA with investor-state provisions for expropriation similarly worded to 
NAFTA would inferably open the door to more ambitious interpretations and usages than 
allowed under domestic takings laws in Canada.  
Other investment enforcement mechanisms outside ISDS 
The standard enforcement mechanism outside ISDS to protect investors’ rights in a trade/trade 
& investment agreement, and also intended to meet the same end objectives of ISDS as 
previously listed, is state-state dispute settlement. In state-state dispute settlement, disputes go 
through state representatives and tariffs are allowed to be raised or agreement concessions or 
obligations suspended as punitive measures.  
Drawing on other conclusions in this assessment, it is the opinion of this study that a well-
crafted state-state dispute settlement mechanism might be a more appropriate enforcement 
mechanism than ISDS in CETA. First, given state-state dispute settlement does not bring with it 
the same sustainability concerns as ISDS (as described in the economic, social and 
environmental assessments hereto), it would have fewer negative impacts if included instead of 
ISDS in CETA. Second, (as described in the economic, social and environmental assessments 
hereto), while advocated by a variety of business groups, there is no strong evidence to suggest 
ISDS brings with it more/maximises net benefits (economic, social or environmental) than state-
state dispute settlement. Herein, it should be noted, however, that it would seem that there is 
at least some risk that if not carefully awarded, remedies (raised tariffs or suspension of 
agreement concessions or obligations) in state-state dispute settlement might have some 
negative impacts, including impacts on industries indirectly related to the investment disputes 
                                                             
46 Herein “diminution of value” refers to the level of loss required to constitute expropriation; whereas the Metalclad 
Corp v. United Mexican States case (hereafter “Metalclad”) shows that NAFTA required “significant” impairment of 
the investment value, not the stricter destruction of nearly the entire value as required in US takings law. “Conceptual 
severance” refers to splitting the value of takings into components of space, time and function to determine the value 
of takings; while this concept is not typically allowed in domestic US law when determining the value of a land taking, 
rulings from Metalclad, Pope & Talbot vs. Canada (hereafter “Pope & Talbot”), and S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada 
(hereafter “S.D. Myers”) by NAFTA tribunals applied this concept. “Police power” refers to the unintentional loss of 
property or other economic disadvantage from ordinary, non-discriminatory state actions like regulation and 
taxation; whereas some suggest Metalclad makes a comparatively limiting judgment on the breadth of police power 
allowed under Chapter 11 when compared to domestic US law. The “ripeness rule” under US law finds that one must 
exhaust state procedures for remedy before filing a case with federal court; however, sources suggest that in 
Metalclad the ripeness rule was not required (although as a note, consultations are required before formal litigation 
in the NAFTA tribunal). Sources: Text of NAFTA Chapter 11, US eminent domain law, and related jurisprudence – for 
example, e.g. Metalclad, Pope & Talbot, and S.D. Myers decisions at www.naftalaw.org. Also, among secondary 
sources see: Shenkman, E. (2002) “Could principles of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence be helpful in analyzing 
regulatory expropriation claims under international law?” New York University Environmental Law Journal 11(1): 174-
197; Porterfield, M. C. (2004) “International expropriations rules and federalism.” Stanford Environmental Law Journal 
23(3): 4-90; and Been, V. and J. C. Beauvais. (2003). “The global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s investment protections 
and the misguided quest for an international ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine.” New York University Law Review 78 (1): 
30-143.) 
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at hand. Also, there would inevitably be concerns among businesses over the effectiveness and 
efficiency of such a mechanism when compared to ISDS. As such, both caution and tact need to 
be exercised in using state-state dispute settlement.    
By way of context, while there has been a trend in new generation trade agreements to include 
ISDS, there are prominent recent examples of trade & investment agreements between 
developed countries which exclude ISDS.47 For example, the US-Australia FTA, signed in 2004 
and entered into force on 1 January 2005, does not include ISDS given opposition to including 
such a mechanism in a trade agreement with developed countries with robust institutions. That 
agreement, however, includes a provision to allow reconsideration of the FTA’s enforcement 
mechanism if warranted. Given this precedent and recent policy statements, it would not be 
surprising if the Australian government seeks to keep ISDS out of the Australia-Japan FTA, 
negotiations on which started in 2007.48 The recent EU-Korea FTA (like other EU-wide FTAs to 
date), signed in 2009 does not include ISDS.  
US and Mexico 
If CETA removes certain barriers in Canada to EU investment – directly or indirectly – it could 
directly or indirectly remove barriers to US and Mexican FDI into Canada. This is due to the 
Chapter 11 MFN and national treatment provisions under NAFTA that would extend to investors 
in “like” circumstances under CETA.  
There is also an automatic extension of liberalisation afforded under NAFTA in what is known as 
the “ratchet” mechanism. The mechanism is invoked in instances of “autonomous” 
liberalisation, i.e. liberalisation that is considered unilateral, and applies to areas listed in Annex 
I of NAFTA although it does not apply to areas listed in Annex II (exclusions) of NAFTA.49    
There remain some questions about the applicability of the NAFTA ratchet mechanism in 
relation to CETA. Consultations with trade negotiators suggest that CETA in unlikely per se to 
trigger the ratchet mechanism given Canada “generally liberalises on an autonomous basis.” 50 
While there could be a chance that CETA would encourage the use of Chapter 11 by the US and 
Mexico in situations where it otherwise would not have been used, i.e. if CETA were not 
implemented, these chances appear to be relatively limited. 
Specifically, there is evidence that negotiations in CETA in particular could liberalise a number of 
services listed in NAFTA Annex II, Schedule of Canada, and while not fully clear what regulatory 
implications this would have for the US and Mexico they appear to be limited. CETA may 
                                                             
47 “Developed” herein used in-line with the IMF categorisation 
48 One update from the Australian authorities finds “We will continue consultations with Australian stakeholders on 
the merits of including investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in an FTA with another developed country.” (Australia-
Japan Free Trade Agreement: Newsletter Update 2. http://dfat.gov.au/fta/ajfta/newsletter_update/update_2.html); 
whereas recent policy statements clearly indicate the Gillard government does not intend to use ISDS in trade 
agreements, at least those with developing countries: “In the past, Australian Governments have sought the inclusion 
of investor-state dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements with developing countries at the behest of 
Australian businesses. The Gillard Government will discontinue this practice. If Australian businesses are concerned 
about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about 
whether they want to commit to investing in those countries.” (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (2011). “Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity.” 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html#investor-state) 
 
49 Consultations with trade negotiators from the European Commission, February 2011 
50 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
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liberalise sectors also listed in some form in NAFTA Annex II, Schedule of Canada, such as certain 
air transportation services, water transportation services, government finance, and telecom 
services. For example, within Annex II of NAFTA, CPC 752 Telecom Services, CPC 7549 – “Other 
Telecommunications Services Not Elsewhere Classified (limited to telecommunications transport 
networks and services)” is listed as having reservations in terms of national treatment, MFN, 
and senior management and boards of directors. Notably, NAFTA Annex IV, Schedule of Canada 
also sets reservations for “telecommunications transport networks and telecommunications 
transport services.”51 In addition, the aforementioned liberalisation does not seem to constitute 
“autonomous” liberalisation, since available evidence suggests it would result at least partly as a 
result of CETA negotiations. This suggests that if CETA were to liberalise CPC 7549, such 
liberalisation would not automatically extend to the US and Mexico under the NAFTA ratchet. 
However, further details of CETA would be required to specifically analyse all types of telecom 
services and government finance and the related reservations in NAFTA Annex II, compared to 
what is being asked for in CETA in order to determine the application of the NAFTA ratchet 
and/or if the US and Mexico would have recourse under investor-state provisions if not 
extended similar treatment. A similar assessment could be performed for air transportation 
services and water transportation services, although these sectors would not seem to extend to 
the US and Mexico even if liberalised for the EU under CETA, given stipulations in Annex IV of 
NAFTA.  
INDICATOR: FDI and portfolio flows (from CETA as a whole), FDI and portfolio flows (from 
Investment Chapter in CETA alone, trade flows (from Investment Chapter in CETA alone), FDI 
and portfolio flows (from ISDS alone), trade flows (from ISDS alone) 
Canada 
The following section will analyse the potential economic impacts of (1) CETA as a whole on 
investment, (2) an Investment Chapter in CETA, and (3) the role of ISDS, within the Investment 
Chapter, as a contributor to the aforementioned impacts. The analysis will draw heavily upon 
trends in investment and trade patterns resulting from BITs/FIPAs and hybrid trade and 
investment agreements like NAFTA.  
FDI flows caused by relevant trade agreements and implications for CETA as a whole 
 
It is generally recognised that investment liberalisation when combined with certain other 
policies encourages investment and growth.52 For example, there is a general consensus that 
                                                             
51 NAFTA Annex IV, Schedule of Canada reads: “Canada takes an exception to Article 1103 for treatment accorded 
under all bilateral or multilateral international agreements in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement. For international agreements in force or signed after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, 
Canada takes an exception to Article 1103 for treatment accorded under those agreements involving: (a) aviation; (b) 
fisheries; (c) maritime matters, including salvage; or (d) telecommunications transport networks and 
telecommunications transport services (this exception does not apply to measures covered by Chapter Thirteen 
(Telecommunications)).” It is notable that the aforementioned reservation (d) does not appear to include all 
telecommunication services that might be liberalised under CETA.  
52 For example, among others see: Kirkpatrick, C., C. George and S. S. Scrieciu (2004). “Implications of Trade and 
Investment Liberalisation for Sustainable Development: Review of Literature.” Impact Assessment Research Centre at 
Institution of Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester. 19 May 2004.  
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NAFTA clearly increased FDI in Mexico. 53 These analyses, however, may not be as relevant to 
CETA, as they typically involve developed countries’ interactions with developing countries.  
Generally, to the extent that a trade and investment agreement like CETA removes barriers to 
FDI it may increase FDI flows. Specifically, gravity modelling performed in this study generally 
supports the argument that removal of restrictions may positively impact the level of bilateral 
investment in such areas. See Annex 3 for further details of these results. 
The impacts of NAFTA on US-Canada investments provide a useful indicator of the possible 
impacts of CETA on EU-Canada investment. There is evidence that NAFTA as a whole 
contributed to some increased investment between the two countries in certain sectors, for 
example in the automotive sector;54 however, it is unclear as to how much the specific impact of 
the Investment Chapter of NAFTA contributed to the aforementioned investment flows. 
Moreover, Hufbauer and Schott (2005) suggest that overall (i.e. inclusive of all provisions in the 
agreements) “the CUSFTA and NAFTA did little to enhance the already mature direct investment 
relationship between Canada and the United States.”55 As such, while NAFTA in its entirety has 
encouraged certain investment between Canada and the US, evidence suggests its contribution 
to overall investment increases between the two countries has not been particularly significant.  
The impact of CETA on investment in Canada will likely be larger than the relatively insignificant 
impacts from CUSFTA and NAFTA. The impacts will be more significant than those between 
Canada and the US under NAFTA because the EU is not as integrated with Canada as the US was 
pre-CUSFTA and pre-NAFTA.  
On the other end of the spectrum, CETA will likely have a less significant impact on investment 
than those predicted for trade agreements between developed and developing countries. This is 
because there is not the same potential for investment growth present in the CETA relationship 
as there would be between Canada, or the EU, and certain developing nations. In a related vein, 
the impact of CETA will be more limited than would be found in an agreement involving 
developing nations given the advanced nature of the institutions and high incomes in the EU and 
Canada, whereas higher income countries in many cases attract less capital flows than those 
with lower incomes (refer to the gravity modelling in Annex 3 for related statistical correlations 
herein). As such, quantitative estimates in studies of agreements between developed and 
developing countries, for example in the EU-Andean SIA on the EU-Andean FTA,56 or among 
developing countries,57 do not provide particularly relevant estimates that can be extended to 
the EU-Canada CETA context. 
 
Some studies might be used to gauge the specific impact of CETA on encouraging investment, an 
exercise requested by the Contracting Authority, although the studies producing quantitative 
results should be extending to the CETA context with great caution. For example, IBM (2008), 
                                                             
53 Among others see Hornbeck, J.F. “NAFTA at Ten: Lessons from Recent Studies.” CRS Report for Congress. 13 
February 2004; and Dee, P. and J. Gali (2003) “The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading 
Arrangements”, NBER working paper 10160. 
54 Hufbauer, G.C. and J.J. Schott. (2005), Chapter 6, discusses the growth of the automotive industry (including via 
investment and other means) as a result of NAFTA. 
55 Ibid, pg 36 
56 See DEVELOPMENT Solutions et. al. (2009).  
57 Among other quantitative projections on increased investment resulting from FTAs with developing countries see 
Jaumotte, Florence (2004). “Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market Size.” IMF 
Working Paper: WP/04/206. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04206.pdf 
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predicts an increase of investment resulting from the EU-Korea FTA given that the FTA is a “deep 
FTA” and that cross-border investment between the EU and Korea would increase and third 
countries will also invest in Korea to benefit from improved market access. Based on these basic 
assumptions, the study then assumes a lower bound rise in FDI equivalent to 30% of the EU 
investment in Korea (slightly below $1 billion/year) and an upper bound 60% rise in FDI 
(equivalent to an annual increase of FDI slightly below $2 billion), for the purpose of inputting 
these assumptions into econometrics predicting according rises in GDP from the FTA over a 
eight year period. 58 It is beyond the scope of this SIA to assess in detail how these specific 
estimates might apply to CETA; however, it is quite clear that the aforementioned assumptions 
are just that, and while perhaps a general metric there is little reason to believe they can be 
used as a reliable proxy for investment increases under CETA.   
By way of another comparison, a variety of studies that reach qualitative conclusions on 
investment encouraged by the trade agreement between the US and Australia should provide 
useful to generally gauging the amount of investment CETA may stimulate. This FTA is likely the 
best comparison to CETA available considering general similarities of the US with the EU, and 
Australia with Canada. Monash (2001) predicts that the FTA would not only encourage US 
investors to invest in Australia but also may additional encourage them to use Australia as a 
base for operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and generally emphasises the ‘head-turning’ 
impact of generating increased interest in investing in Australia.59 USITC (2004) finds that “The 
markets in both the United States and Australia are substantially open to foreign direct 
investment under current policies. Therefore, according to several U.S. industry representatives, 
the U.S.-Australia FTA is not expected to have a significant impact on the level of U.S. direct 
investment in Australia, or the level of Australian direct investment in the United States.” 
(emphasis added) 60 It is notable that Stoler (2009) finds that in fact several years after the FTA 
was in force, US investment in Australia dropped for a number of years, and Australian 
investment in the US surprisingly grew to exceed American investment in Australia, although 
also notes that a longer period of time would need to be considered before tying such trends to 
the US-Australia FTA.61  
 
Given the aforementioned findings, it seems reasonable to assume that CETA, like the US-
Australia FTA, might encourage investment in Canada and the EU to the extent envisaged by the 
aforementioned studies. In other words, it could encourage investment, but not significantly 
increase investment. This also at least leaves open the possibility that such an increase could be 
closer to a ‘minor’ rather than ‘significant’ magnitude. 
While the US-Australia FTA is the best proxy available to evaluate investment under CETA, by 
way of additional analysis, there is reason to believe that investment realised under CETA could 
be at least slightly more significant than that under that agreement. It should be noted that 
Australia is significantly less restricted to FDI from the RoW than Canada in sub-sectors like 
                                                             
58 IBM Belgium et al. (2008). “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA: Final Report – (Phase 3)” 
http://www.eu-korea-
sia.org/uploads/filedir/Docs/Front%20Page%20T/EU%20Korea%20FTA%20SIA%20Phase%203%20Final%20Report.pdf 
59 Monash (2001). “An Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement: Issues and Implications.” Report for DFAT, APEC Study 
Centre, Monash University. http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/aus_us_fta_mon/aus_us_fta_mon.pdf 
60 USITC (2004). US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economywide and Selected Sectoral Effects.” USITC 
Publication 3697. Pg 104. http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/2104f/pub3697.pdf 
61 Stoler, Andrew (2009). “Economic Impact of the AUSFTA.” Institute for International Trade. Paper for Fulbright 
Symposium, Canberra, Australia. 
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fishing and telecom, which put some upward pressure on Canada’s overall FDI restrictiveness – 
whereas Australia’s overall OECD FDI Restrictiveness index was 0.270 in 2003 vs. Canada’s 0.352, 
and Australia’s 2010 index was 0.138 vs. Canada’s .153 (and the EU24’s was 0.048). As such, 
CETA may encourage investment in Canada in these sub-sectors more so than the US-Australia 
FTA would encourage investment in such sectors in Australia. The effects of reducing investment 
barriers in creating economic benefits in Canada will likely be magnified by other provisions of 
CETA, particularly if these provisions are ambitious – for example those on government 
procurement, IPR, labour mobility, competition policy, and free circulation of goods (as well as 
those provisions typically found in FTAs in terms of trade facilitation, all provisions liberalising 
restrictions in services, and tariff reductions). These provisions may act along with other 
provisions of CETA to encourage investment flows, particularly in sectors where EU-Canada 
economic activity occurs as a result of global and regional value chains, investment and sales by 
foreign affiliates, and flows of people and technologies.62 For these reasons, it is the opinion of 
the study that CETA might encourage ‘notable’ investment, and this might be somewhat greater 
than the investment realised under the US-Australia FTA. 
In summary, it is the opinion of the study that CETA might encourage ‘notable’ investment, but 
it is less likely that it will be ‘significant.’ The metrics herein are defined in the methodology of 
this SIA, and are supported by relevant economic literature. 
Impact of BITs on investment flows and trade, and implications for an Investment Chapter in 
CETA 
Certain studies suggest BITs themselves are not significant determinants of investment flows, 
and emphasise other factors are more significant determinants of investment flows. For 
example, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Rose-Ackermann (2005) use empirical analysis to find 
BITs are not significant determinants of investment flows.63 UNCTAD (2003) finds that “BITS play 
a minor role in influencing global FDI flows” and in another part of the report says “the policy 
framework [of BITs] is at best enabling, having by itself little or no effect on FDI flows.”64 
However, it should be highlighted that the same study does suggest that provisions in BITs do 
provide an “enabling” function for IIAs to ensure investors certain security in their investments 
after they decide to invest in a country.65 Specifically, factors that encourage FDI may include 
reduction of numerous NTBs restricting investment, and pull factors such as market size, 
infrastructure, human capital, and certain tax rules/incentives,66 among other elements.  
In contrast, other studies find a positive correlation between the number of BITs signed and the 
foreign investment received by a country. Importantly, these findings  do not suggest that 
                                                             
62 Goldfarb, D and L. Theriault (2010). “Canada’s ‘Missing’ Trade With the European Union.” The Conference Board of 
Canada 
63 Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2003). “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties attract FDI?” http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091104060047/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf; Rose-Ackermann (2005). “Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in 
Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties.” Yale University. 
64 See UNCTAD (2003). World Investment Report 2003, pgs 89 and 91 respectively 
65 For example, see UNCTAD (2003). World Investment Report 2003. For a comparison of the conflicting economic 
theories on foreign investment see Sornarajah, M. (2004) “The International Law on Foreign Investment.” 2nd edition, 
Cambridge. 
66 However, it should be noted that Blonigen and Davis (2000) suggest that tax treaties specifically can discourage FDI 
as they can be used to reduce tax evasion and not only make it easier to avoid double taxation. Source: Blonigen, B. 
and R. Davis. 2000. "The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity." NBER Working Paper 7929. Cambridge: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  
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signing a BIT in itself increases investment, although do somewhat support the economic utility 
in signing BITs.67 Still, even while establishing correlation of investment flows with the number 
of BITs signed, a number of other explanatory variables outside the BITs themselves would 
appear to be at work contributing to such increases in investment. 
 
Other studies critique Hallward-Driemeier (2003) directly, noting that the study does not fully 
consider the international integration that BITs in fact do foster. They suggest a country may 
benefit from a BIT if the treaty allows them to enhance international connections, like those 
related to expansion of trade or to increase value added in products. Swenson (2008)68 follows 
this line of thought, and focuses on BIT’s effect on trade rather than just investment, analysing 
trade flows from 1975 to 2000. The study’s results suggest that investment treaties improve 
capital goods and differentiated goods, particularly for multinational companies. One reason 
used to explain why past studies did not find BITs to be statistically significant facilitators of 
commerce is that expanded activity via foreign presence of multinational firms does not 
necessarily imply that the host country will see high value foreign investments given the firms’ 
main investments may take an intangible form rather than one in fixed assets. The study also 
suggests, although not supported with specific evidence, that this may increase multinational 
technology transfer and finds “if BITs encourage high value trade, their presence may bring the 
benefits such as enhanced rates of country growth that are hoped for by signatory countries.”69 
 
Although the literature is mixed on the precise economic benefits of BITs as trade and 
investment enhancing agents, what is clear in the studies that find BITs/the signing of more BITs 
to be trade and/or investment enhancing is that the level of any benefit is much less when 
involving a high income country with strong institutions. Specifically, the effects of BITs are far 
more significant when involving low income countries than when involving high income 
countries. Swenson (2008) makes this point. Blonigen and Wang (2005),70 Subramanian and Wei 
(2007),71 and Wheeler and Mody (1992),72 while not all analysing BITs specifically, emphasise 
that the magnitude of trade and investment differs notably when measuring the effects of 
international trade and investment agreements by grouping countries with different levels of 
development. Nunn (2007)73 and Levchenko (2006)74 find that investment protections are 
                                                             
67 Egger, P. and M. Pfaffermayr. (2004) “The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment” 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4):788-804. Egger, Peter and Valeria Merlo. (2007) “BITs and FDI Dynamics.” 
World Economy; Salacuse, J. and N. Sullivan. (2004) “Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,” Harvard International Law Journal: 46(1); Neumayer, E. and L. Spess (2005). “Do 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment?” World Development, 33(10): 1567-1585. Note: 
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) look at OECD investment, while Salacuse and Sullivan (2004) and Neumayer and Spess 
(2004) use larger sets of countries. 
68 Swenson, D. (2008). “Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Integration.” University of California 
Department of Economics. Working Paper. 
69 Ibid at Pg 14  
70 Blonigen, B. A. and M. Wang. (2005) “The Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in Empirical FDI 
Studies”, in T. Moran, E. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds.) “Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? 
Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 221-243.  
71 Subramanian, A. and SJ Wei. (2007) “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly,” Journal of International 
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72 Wheeler, D. and A. Mody. (1992) “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of US Firms.” Journal of 
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73 Nunn, Nathan. (2007) ”'Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade.'' Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 122, No. 2. 
74 Levchenko, A. (2006) “Institutional Quality and International Trade.” Review of Economic Studies. 
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associated with an increase in the quality of trade, and that these impacts are most prominent 
in countries with weaker institutions and infrastructure needed to facilitate trade. As 
mentioned, the gravity modelling in Annex 3 of this study further lends support to the concept 
that capital generally moves from higher income countries to lower income countries. 
 
The above findings in their entirety do not provide a strong consensus that signing a BIT by itself 
will either prevent capital flight or enhance/increase investment, although there are certainly 
elements of evidence that indicate that under certain circumstances they could increase trade 
and commerce more generally. Specifically, BITs do appear to have economic benefits in that 
they provide benefits to multinational companies; foster forms of intangible business 
relationships, which may have economic benefits; stimulate the flows of trade in terms of 
capital and differentiated goods in countries with lower incomes; and in the sense that the 
signing of more BITs is positively associated with FDI flows (although a number of other 
explanatory variables outside the BITs themselves would appear to be at work contributing to 
such increases in investment). It is noteworthy herein that the studies that most strongly tout 
the benefits of signing a single BIT suggest the effects will be felt more in areas that are not 
measured in conventional investment statistics. Given these findings, an Investment Chapter in 
CETA by itself will appear to have a positive impact in terms of encouraging trade, and less 
evidence suggests it might encourage investment as commonly measured. 
 
This said, there is good reason to believe that the economic benefits created by an Investment 
Chapter in CETA would be less than significant, i.e. on a level of minor to notable but less than 
significant. This conclusion is reasonable given the mixed evidence as to the magnitude of 
economic benefits from BITs, none of which suggest that they lead to significant increases in 
trade, intangible linkages, or investment specifically, and many of which specifically suggest they 
in fact do not lead to significant increases in investment. The conclusion is also based on the fact 
that the trade, commerce and investment institutions in the EU and Canada are among the best 
in the world and citizens of Canada and EU MS enjoy some of the highest per capita incomes in 
the world – which, according to the literature, would mean they would see relatively less 
benefits from an agreement like CETA than if the agreement were to involve a developing 
nation(s) with lower per capita incomes. This likely also explains why all of the 6 FIPAs Canada 
has signed with EU countries are with relatively less developed countries as opposed to with its 
most important investment partner in Europe – the UK.75   
 
Box 35: FDI vs. portfolio flows 
 
FDI vs. portfolio flows 
Further research and analysis is needed to distinguish the specific impacts of an Investment 
Chapter in CETA on FDI vs. portfolio flows. There are distinctions in decision-making behind 
portfolio investments compared to FDI. Generally, the aforementioned impacts regarding 
investment flows specifically apply to FDI given its relative importance in the economic studies 
                                                             
75 It would be useful to analyse what additional areas of liberalisation might be afforded by CETA investment 
provisions vs. existing EU BITs and Canada FIPAs. For example, compared to the bilateral Canada-Poland FIPA/BIT, or 
through the Canadian and EU accession to the OECD Code on for Liberalisation of Capital Markets.  This comparison 
would also be helpful in determining the specific impact of ISDS under CETA. Unfortunately, given the lack of details 
of CETA among other limitations, it is beyond the scope of this SIA to perform such an exercise. 
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reviewed. Still, extending the economic logic exhibited in the gravity modelling in this report, 
portfolio flows will likely be encouraged through CETA to the degree that barriers currently 
inhibiting flows are removed, although the significance of this is uncertain. This would facilitate 
capital flows to firms that rely on portfolio investment, for example the finance industry. As with 
FDI, however, the impact of CETA in this regard would be lessened given the advanced nature of 
the institutions currently in Canada.  
 
Impact of BITs on FDI flows and trade, and implications for ISDS provisions in particular 
 
The role of ISDS in particular as a contributor to the aforementioned economic benefits of an 
Investment Chapter in CETA is unclear, as there does not appear to be readily available empirical 
evidence on the matter. Care should be taken not to confuse causality between the increased 
investment that CETA could foster by reducing barriers to investment in Canada via an 
Investment Chapter as a whole and the impacts of investor-state provisions in CETA in 
particular.  
 
In the absence of such results, one could make three different assumptions as to the role of ISDS 
in contributing to these benefits. These assumptions would be that ISDS is an enabler in the 
economic benefits that are created by BITs, as it is clearly a core pillar of enforcement in such 
agreements; ISDS does not contribute to these overall benefits; or that the allowance of ISDS in 
BITs actually reduces the level of economic benefits otherwise created by BITs.  
The first of these assumptions is the most intuitive and provides some support for the idea that 
ISDS allowances in CETA would contribute to the overall economic benefits attributed to an 
Investment Chapter in CETA. Given the findings of Swenson (2008) that BITs provide economic 
benefits to multinational companies, it appears reasonable to suggest that many multinational 
companies at least are aware of the security provided by ISDS. However, given the lack of 
available surveys suggesting otherwise, it seems reasonable to suggest that most SMEs would 
not consider ISDS as providing “security” to their investments as the economic benefits of ISDS 
appear to be most significantly realised by MNCs and given the general trend among SMEs in 
lacking resources for large scale legal action like the type typically involved in ISDS cases. Still, 
there are examples of individual investors or families of investors bringing Chapter 11 cases 
against Canada, for example. Also, as discussed in the “Impact on institutional and regulatory 
environment for investment” indicator hereto, ISDS most certainly serves a role in the 
functioning, and thus as some kind of contributor to the economic benefits realised from BITs, 
which are tantamount to an Investment Chapter in CETA. To be sure, without an enforcement 
mechanism there is no reason to believe that an Investment Chapter in CETA would stimulate 
the same positive economic impacts as predicted earlier in this analysis. 
However, even the aforementioned assumption does not convincingly support the conclusion 
that ISDS as currently structured maximises sustainable economic benefits. First, and again, the 
assumption cannot be made with full confidence and would need to be subject to empirical 
testing. Second, an important distinction should be drawn between ISDS as a general 
enforcement mechanism, just as state-state dispute settlement is an enforcement mechanism, 
vs. investor-state provisions in particular.  
The question then becomes what is the ideal structure for an investment enforcement 
mechanism in maximising what is referred to hereafter as ‘sustainable economic benefits.’ As 
discussed under the “Impact on institutional and regulatory environment for investment” 
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indicator, opponents of ISDS have not only expressed criticism over the existence of investor-
state provisions but many appear more critical of the compounded effect such provisions have 
when implemented by existing tribunals in terms of lack of transparency, fairness and other 
issues. This suggests that the ISDS mechanisms as currently functioning are not ideal in the 
sense that they deserve to be improved in order to more clearly create sustainable economic 
benefits. In analysing the economic benefits of ISDS one would have to consider how much of a 
magnifying effect investor-state provisions will have in contributing to the economic benefits 
from an Investment Chapter. Further, even if ISDS is an enabler within the Investment Chapter 
of CETA in creating economic benefits, what additional benefits might be realised if ISDS 
provisions in CETA operated in a different, arguably improved/less partial, manner than ISDS at 
present? And how would this compare to the state-state dispute settlement mechanism, as 
mentioned in the “Impact on institutional and regulatory environment for investment” 
indicator? Moreover, do the monetary benefits from ISDS outweigh the potential negative 
economic costs as mentioned under the “Economic costs and benefits of ISDS” indicator below? 
Note: Even if it was found that ISDS as currently structured in CETA is ideal and would contribute 
to maximise the economic benefits realised from an Investment Chapter and CETA as a whole, 
several questions must be answered before concluding that ISDS provisions in CETA will produce 
net sustainability benefits.76 
Conclusion 
The impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be positive, may be ‘notable,’ 
but is expected to be less than ‘significant.’ More specifically, CETA will likely positively impact 
investment in certain sectors in particular. Investment liberalisation in CETA is likely to reinforce 
existing trends in bilateral investment, with the majority of flows expected to be directed 
towards the financial, energy and mining sectors. If on the table, removal of restrictions in such 
sectors as telecom; transportation services, including water and transportation services; 
fisheries; finance; and mining/uranium sub-sectors may positively impact the level of bilateral 
investment in such areas. While consultations with the Contracting Authority suggest that CETA 
negotiations would not actively seek liberalisation of the media content sector in Canada, and 
thus it was not looked at in-depth in this SIA,77 it should importantly be noted that stakeholders, 
for example the Canadian Media Production Association (CMPA), have expressed concern that 
liberalisation of telecoms could in-turn lead to pushes to liberalise certain cultural industries.78 
For more specific information on CETA’s impact on investment in certain sectors refer to the 
sectoral assessment sections of this SIA. 
                                                             
76 In particular, it would need to be carefully considered if the monetary benefits discussed therein would outweigh 
the potential negative economic, social and environmental impacts mentioned in both the “Economic costs and 
benefits of ISDS” and economic, social, and environmental “policy space” indicators hereto. It is unclear if ISDS as 
currently structured in CETA would create any such net benefits, and there is reason to be concerned that it would 
result in net losses. 
77 Consultations with the Contracting Authority at the Project Steering Committee Meeting in September 2010. As a 
note, if CETA were to liberalise the media sector in Canada, which has the highest level of restrictiveness of any sector 
in Canada, this would encourage investment in this sector.  
78 Feedback from the CMPA, finds that “The CMPA is therefore of the view that any move to significantly liberalize the 
FDI rules in telecommunications, as contemplated by the CETA, would inevitably lead to comparable liberalization of 
FDI rules for broadcasting and broadcasting distribution – irrespective of the fact that the EU professes that it is 
currently not seeking liberalization of FDI rules as they apply to Canada’s cultural industries.” (submission to study 
team by Norm Bolen, CMPA, 11 April 2011) 
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The Investment Chapter in CETA in particular could encourage economic benefits in Canada 
although the significance of these will likely be minor to notable at most. An Investment Chapter 
in CETA could provide benefits to multinational companies and foster forms of intangible 
business relationships, which may have economic benefits; and stimulate the flows of capital 
and differentiated goods. Evidence is much weaker that it will specifically increase FDI flows. It is 
unclear if an ISDS mechanism as currently structured within an Investment Chapter would in 
itself create net economic benefits, although there is doubt that the mechanism as operating is 
maximising sustainable economic benefits, let alone maximising such benefits in a way state-
state dispute settlement in CETA could not. 
EU 
Investment in the EU under CETA would likely follow the positive trend predicted for Canada, 
but on a smaller scale. This is due to the relatively larger size of the EU economy compared to 
Canada, which makes a percentage increase in Canadian investment in the EU less significant in 
the EU than the impact in Canada of same increase in EU investment in Canada. Also, given 
Canada is currently more restricted to FDI than the EU at large (see “Quality of institutional and 
regulatory environment” indicator above), reduction of investment barriers in CETA will likely 
encourage new investment in Canada more so than in the EU. CETA is likely to reinforce existing 
trends in Canada-EU bilateral investment. This assessment is generally supported by the FDI 
gravity modelling performed for this report (see Annex 3). 
With regards to ISDS in CETA in particular, given limitations in research and analysis on the 
subject, it is not possible to decompose the economic impacts such provisions may have on the 
EU. On one hand, as mentioned in the Canada section, it seems intuitive that ISDS allowances in 
CETA would contribute to the overall economic benefits attributed to an Investment Chapter in 
CETA and CETA overall. However, again, this assumption cannot be made with full confidence 
and would need to be subject to empirical testing. 
Several questions must be answered before concluding that ISDS as currently structured in CETA 
will produce net sustainability benefits. In the absence of such research and analysis it is unclear 
if an ISDS mechanism as currently structured within an Investment Chapter would in itself create 
net economic benefits. And even if it can be generally ascertained that ISDS provisions in CETA 
would contribute to the overall economic benefits realised from an Investment Chapter in CETA 
and CETA as a whole, it is doubtful whether the mechanism is operating in maximising 
sustainable economic benefits. 
US and Mexico 
CETA would have a minor or perhaps lesser impact on investment into the US and Mexico, and 
may encourage investment from these countries in Canada. Chapter 11 of NAFTA automatically 
extends MFN and national treatment status to the US and Mexico in “like” circumstances that 
may occur under CETA, and thus the US and Mexico in certain cases would be granted the same 
opportunities to invest in Canada that the EU would enjoy under CETA. However, the legalities 
herein are nuanced, and thus there may not be many benefits from CETA realised under this 
mechanism as a result (see the “Quality of institutional and regulatory environment for FDI” 
indicator for more information herein). Of course the US and Mexico would not be granted the 
same opportunities Canada would gain to invest in the EU, although it should be considered that 
Mexico recently signed an FTA with the EU, which would likely make this mostly a non-issue for 
Mexico.  
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To the degree that EU or Canadian investment is diverted from the US and/or Mexico as a result 
of CETA, this would clearly negatively impact investment flows to these countries. In the US in 
particular, some have warned that the combined effect of the EU signing trade agreements with 
Canada and Korea could undermine US trade policy, investment inclusive, which has failed thus 
far to move forward with certain trade agreements, like the one with Korea.79 The degree of this 
diversion is uncertain.  
 
INDICATOR: GDP 
It is a well documented phenomenon that investment liberalisation when combined with trade 
and certain other policies encourages GDP growth.80 CGE modelling results from studies 
conducted on trade agreements between developed countries such as the US and Australia, EU 
and Korea, and Japan and Australia,81 and between developed and developing countries like the 
EU-ASEAN FTA82 suggest a strong growth in GDP from increases in trade and FDI, particularly in 
the long-run. Long-run capital mobility is partially responsible for this suggested growth. This 
body of quantitative evidence also suggests that the overall positive effects in the various 
sectors tend to accrue more towards services given the predominance of FDI flows to that 
sector.  
Some studies might be used to gauge the specific impact of CETA on encouraging investment 
and related impacts on GDP, an exercise requested by the Contracting Authority, although the 
studies producing quantitative results should be extending to the CETA context with great 
caution. As mentioned in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator, IBM (2008), assumes a lower 
bound rise in FDI equivalent to 30% of the EU investment in Korea (slightly below $1 
billion/year) and an upper bound 60% rise in FDI (equivalent to an annual increase of FDI slightly 
below $2 billion) for the purpose of inputting these assumptions into econometrics predicting 
according rises in GDP from the FTA over an eight year period. The study then finds a “rather 
significant macroeconomic impact” on Korea, with an average annual real GDP growth rate over 
the eight year period tested (2008-2015) that is 0.2% higher than in the lower bound scenario 
without the increased investment and almost 0.4% higher than in the upper bound scenario 
without the increased investment.83 While it is beyond the scope of this SIA to assess in detail 
how these specific estimates might apply to CETA, it is quite clear that the aforementioned 
assumptions are just that, and while perhaps a general metric there is little reason to believe 
they can be used as a reliable proxy for investment and related GDP increases under CETA.   
More generally, however, given the findings in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator, it is 
reasonable to suggest the impact of CETA as a whole on investment in Canada will likely be 
positive, could be of a notable magnitude, and thus this could contribute to some increases in 
GDP growth in Canada and the EU. Certain increases in efficiencies of investment under CETA 
                                                             
79 Cooper, William H. et al. (2011) “The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United 
States.” CRS Report for Congress. 7-5700. 
80 For example, among others see: Kirkpatrick, C. et al (2004)  
81 Centre for International Economics (2005) 
82 Institute for International Development and Economics (2009). Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment for FTA 
between EU and ASEAN. March 2009.  
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could have a multiplier effect in positively impacting GDP. This conclusion is further supported 
by the fact that an important amount of the EU-Canada economic relationship, for example the 
Canada-UK economic relationship, is based on investment and more intangible connections. 
The Investment Chapter in CETA in particular could encourage economic benefits of a minor to 
notable magnitude, yet this chapter by itself would likely result in negligible increases in GDP 
growth. An Investment Chapter in CETA could encourage a number of economic benefits in 
Canada which are not necessarily investment-related effects, although as mentioned in the “FDI 
and portfolio flows…” indicator the significance of these benefits will likely be minor to notable 
at most. Given the high level of development of both economies it is unlikely that this will lead 
to measurable increases in GDP growth in percentage terms. As such, ISDS allowances within an 
Investment Chapter in CETA would not have a measurable positive effect on GDP in either 
Canada or the EU. 
 
INDICATOR:  Economic costs and benefits of ISDS  
Canada 
Canadian stakeholders have expressed concern that investor-state provisions in CETA would 
lead to ISDS cases with significant costs in terms of damages and legal fees, as well as a 
significant number of such cases. The following analysis assesses these concerns of stakeholders 
using Canada’s experiences under NAFTA as a tool of comparison. Specifically, this section (1) 
assesses the significance of the monetary damages and legal fees borne by NAFTA signatories 
vs. the objectives of ISDS in terms of monetary benefits, and (2) assesses the trends in terms of 
number of ISDS cases over the last 16 years post-implementation of NAFTA, and determines if 
including ISDS in CETA would create similar trends. 
Costs of NAFTA ISDS in terms of damages and legal fees  
While CETA provisions modelled off on NAFTA Chapter 11 would indeed likely cost Canada 
directly paid-out damages on successful cases, the significance of these payments deserves 
further analysis. For example, from 1994 to early 2011 there were only 4 cases against Canada 
under Chapter 11 that resulted in monetary settlements.84 One case filed in 1997 by the Ethyl 
Corporation, a US chemical company suing over a ban on import and inter-provincial trade of 
the gasoline-additive MMT, resulted in $US 13 million in damages. A 1998 case involving S.D. 
Myers Inc., a US waste disposal company suing over a temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes, 
resulted in payment of $US 5 million (plus interest). And the third case, also filed in 1998, 
involving Pope & Talbot Inc., a US lumber company that challenged Canada’s export quota 
system, resulted in a payment of $CAN 915,000.85 In August 2010, the Canadian government 
agreed to pay $CAN 130 million to Abitibi Bowater Inc. in an out-of-court settlement over 
measures taken by the local government of Newfoundland and Labrador to return to the timber 
and water usage rights held by the company to the state and expropriate certain assets and 
lands associated with the company’s usage rights. 86 This single case is particularly significant 
                                                             
84 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010). The Trammel Crow Co. case, filed in 2001, resulted in an out-of-
court settlement that did not involve payment of damages 
85 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
86 All figures taken from review of cases as listed in Ibid 
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from a monetary standpoint as it constitutes approximately 83% of all investor-state damages 
(as valued in $CAN) awarded during the 16 years in which NAFTA has been in force.87 
The aforementioned four cases are out of a total of 28 cases filed under Chapter 11 against 
Canada from 1994-2010, and out of a total of 64 cases formally brought by NAFTA countries 
against one another during that time.  
The importance of the payments under these four cases is debatable. These cases account for a 
miniscule percentage of the $CAD billions in average annual trade flows among Canada and its 
NAFTA partners. As another illustration, on one hand it might be more relevant to compare the 
damages paid under Chapter 11 cases to money that could be spent on environmental 
protection programs, given these four cases deal with environmental issues in some manner; 
however, this could be a skewed comparison given the uncertainty of ISDS as a contributor to 
economic benefits (see “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator) and given that, depending on a 
number of factors, a dollar increase in government spending may have a higher or in fact lower 
than 1:1 cost-to-sustainability-benefits ratio. 
As an alternative comparison, Table 67 not only considers average bilateral FDI flows among 
NAFTA countries but also NAFTA’s contribution, in percentage terms, to FDI flow from the US 
(the source of all the winning investor-state cases) to Canada. It shows that NAFTA investor-
state provisions have produced relatively little economic costs as a percentage of bilateral FDI 
flows from the US to Canada over the last 16 years.  
 
Table 67: $ Costs of US Chapter 11 cases against Canada vs. avg. annual bilateral FDI inflows 
from US (millions of $CAD) 
Total Chapter 11 damages 
paid by Canada since NAFTA 
implemented/yr* 
Avg. annual FDI inflow 
from US to Canada 
Damages as %  of FDI 
inflow from US 
$10.5 (yearly avg.) $12,337 0.0% 
*From $CAD 157 in Sinclair (Oct. 2010), unclear from source if this amount also includes any awards of legal costs (see 
note 3, pg 22 Sinclair (Oct. 2010)). Sources: Damage amounts from Sinclair (October 2010), FDI statistics from 
Statistics Canada. FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 (data for 2010 unavailable) 
 
The legal fees Canada has incurred defending against these specific cases and in defending all 
other cases (i.e. those that are still pending or did not result in the award of damages to the 
complainant) should additionally be considered. It has been suggested that the cost of 
administering a NAFTA arbitration panel usually falls between $500,000 to $1 million or more, 
and the losing party typically pays the costs of the arbitration itself; additionally, governments 
“routinely incur costs of several million dollars or more” when defending themselves in NAFTA 
cases.88  One might question these numbers, for example, using cost estimates of the Canadian 
Tembec Inc. vs. the US case, which sources report resulted in the costs of the proceedings (which 
appears to be all of the costs) of only $271,000 to be paid to the US government. Still, some 
sources suggest that the legal defence costs of ISDS could be particularly extreme, citing 
                                                             
87 Author’s calculations using figure of $CAD 157 million mentioned in Ibid (which appears to incorporate at least 
some interest rate and exchange rate calculations). 
88 Sinclair (Oct. 2010), pg 24 
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examples where EU MS have had to pay $USD 10-15 million in defending themselves under 
bilateral investment treaties.89 Other sources suggest that any ISDS costs should be 
contextualised by comparing the costs of domestic legal fees for a case of expropriation vs. legal 
fees incurred in the ISDS tribunal.90 Tribunals decide how to divide legal costs among parties to 
disputes. Table 68 considers how the costs of defending an investor-state case combined with 
the damages that may be paid out upon losing such a case compare to FDI flows. It also 
considers the economic benefits of ISDS in NAFTA vs. costs in terms of impacts on policy space. 
 























Economic benefits for 
Canada from ISDS in 
NAFTA 
Costs to Canada from 
ISDS in CETA in terms of 
impacts on policy 
space*** 
$29/yr avg. $12,337 
 
0.2%  May have/continue to 
contribute to some overall 
trends in NAFTA to: 
Increase in trade, and 
relationships stimulating 
output and VA 
 
= Uncertain. And even if 
contributed to the 
aforementioned benefits, 
overall benefit has been less 
than significant** 
  
Potential costs from  ↓  
policy space as relevant to 
the SIA 
 
= Uncertain. Likely less than 
significant but could be 
minor to notable  
 
* Uses $CAD 157 in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) as amount of damages, unclear from source if this amount also includes any 
awards of legal costs (see note 3, pg 22 Sinclair, S (Oct. 2010)). Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as 
the cost of every one of the 28 investor-state cases brought against Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the 
average costs are likely far less and given that if the defendant is successful they often are at least partially 
compensated for their costs). Herein, costs of successful cases only would be $CAD 197 million. **Finding from 
Hufbauer and Schott (2005) *** Economic, social and environmental “policy space” as relevant to this SIA and as 
further analysed under the policy space indicators hereto. FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 (data for 2010 unavailable). 
Sources: Damage amounts from Sinclair (Oct. 2010), FDI statistics from Statistics Canada  
 
Drawing from Table 68, even when adding in an extreme upper bound for legal costs, the 
aforementioned conclusion remains the same, i.e. that NAFTA ISDS has produced relatively little 
costs when compared to US-Canada investment flows since the implementation of NAFTA. 
However, and importantly, NAFTA ISDS also has not produced a relatively 
                                                             
89 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
90 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
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significant/quantifiable monetary benefit. There are also policy space implications of such ISDS, 
which are discussed further in the “Policy space” indicator(s) hereto. 
It is worth noting that there has been some discussion in Canada over who will pay the damages 
of NAFTA Chapter 11, which could have implications for individual provinces’ budgets. The issue 
here is over if or to what extent the federal government of Canada should be responsible for 
paying the damages of Chapter 11 against the actions of local governments. Most recently, after 
the Abitibi Bowater settlement the Canadian Prime Minister is reported as saying “I have 
indicated that in future, should provincial actions cause significant legal obligations for the 
government of Canada, the government of Canada will create a mechanism so that it can 
reclaim monies lost through international trade processes.”91 It is unclear how this mechanism 
might work, although if provinces are made responsible for paying damages this would put a 
new source of pressure on their budgets. 
Number of ISDS cases under NAFTA 
As mentioned, there have been 64 Chapter 11 cases formally filed from 1994- 2010. US 
investors brought 43 cases (27 cases against Canada and 16 against Mexico), Canadian investors 
brought 18 cases (17 against the US and 1 against Mexico), and Mexican investors brought 3 
cases (2 against the US and 1 against Canada). 
There does not appear to be a clear trend in the overall number of Chapter 11 cases brought 
over the last 16 years. Figure 7 below illustrates this point. However, one could cautiously point 
out a few trends. First, there is a trend in recent years towards not bringing cases against 
Mexico. There does appear to be somewhat of an increased trend in bringing cases against 
Canada (brought by US investors). There does not seem to be a particularly identifiable trend in 





















                                                             
91 The Globe and Mail, August 27, 2010, page B3 
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Figure 7: Number of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases by year (1994 – 2010) 
 
Sources: Cases tallied from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
Despite these findings, it is worth noting that at the international level the frequency of ISDS 
cases have risen dramatically since 1994. As mentioned previously, UNCTAD suggests that the 
increase in investor-state disputes has arisen as increased international investment flows and 
more IIAs lead to more occasions for such disputes and related cases. Also, with increased 
numbers of investment agreements in place, more investor-state disputes are likely to be within 
the realm of ISDS. Another reason for the increase may be the increased complexity of recent 
IIAs and other regulatory hurdles in their correct implementation. Additionally, as investors hear 
about successful claims, more investors may be encouraged to use the mechanism.92 
The four successful Chapter 11 cases brought against Canada to date are out of a total of 28 
cases filed under Chapter 11 against Canada from 1994-2010, although only 13 cases appear to 
have been completed93 and some sources suggest that only 8 cases in fact have led to a publicly 
confirmed final result in arbitration.94 These figures suggest that 14% of NAFTA investor-state 
cases against Canada have resulted in awarding of damages to date. Although, when calculating 
this as a percentage of decided cases, depending on the number one uses for decided cases this 
means either 31% or 50% of cases have resulted in awarding of damages. It is worth noting that 
Canada has defended against the highest number of investor-state cases under NAFTA.95  
                                                             
92 UNCTAD (2005) 
93 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
94 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
95 Specifically, 9 more than the US and 11 more than Mexico (or 9 depending on if one considers the “Halcehtte” and 
“Scott Ashton Blair” arbitrations as listed in Sinclair (2010) that according to that same source never commenced). 
Since no notice of arbitration was even provided for these 2 cases they are ignored throughout this analysis. The US 
had 19 cases filed against it and Mexico had 17 cases filed against it from 1994 – Oct. 1, 2010.  Source: Review of 
cases in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
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As a further note, there does not appear to be a particularly significant trend in terms of the 
industries in which Chapter 11 cases have been brought against Canada, as these 28 cases 
include a wide array of industries: chemicals; recreation (outfitting/hunting); water disposal; 
water transport; lumber, paper and forestry; mining; fishing; oil and gas; courier services; real 
estate; media; dairy; healthcare; construction; pharmaceuticals; and on energy-related taxation 
policies. 
Conclusions: 
This analysis puts into perspective the direct monetary cost of the damages awarded and trends 
in terms of number of cases brought under Chapter 11 under NAFTA 16 years after 
implementation. The costs are not as significant as some stakeholders suggest but at the same 
time have not produced a significant quantifiable net monetary benefit. There has not been a 
clear trend in the overall number of Chapter 11 cases. This understanding is useful when 
considering the potential impacts of ISDS in CETA.  
Damages and number of ISDS cases under CETA 
Consultations with EC trade negotiators suggest that the fact that CETA is unlikely to liberalise 
the Canadian market much beyond what is afforded to the US and Mexico under NAFTA should 
serve to reduce the significance of damages and legal fees and the number of cases brought 
under CETA’s ISDS mechanism.96  
 
Allowing ISDS in CETA will clearly open a new avenue for EU investors to sue Canadians, as the 
EU is not a party to NAFTA (although technically EU firms seemingly have had some chance to 
utilise ISDS under NAFTA given its ‘third country incorporation’ provision). Further, judging both 
from consultations with EC trade negotiators and stakeholders, CETA would at least provide 
certain types of liberalisation not currently afforded to the US and Mexico in NAFTA. These 
advances may be in the mining (uranium), transportation services, fisheries, and finance sub-
sectors. As discussed in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicators, these advancements will likely 
create some economic benefits, however minor. At the same time, however, these advances 
clearly increase the probability that investor-state cases would be initiated against Canada.  
 
Herein, the level of litigiousness of EU investors would be one determinant of the frequency and 
monetary costs Canada would incur as a result of including ISDS in CETA. For the sake of 
analysis, assuming the EU is as generally as litigious as the US, and if the same basic 
liberalisation is afforded to the EU as afforded to the US under NAFTA, this would imply that 
Canada could expect to be on the defensive for the same number of cases and pay damages and 
legal fees roughly around the same as incurred under NAFTA to date. Specifically, taking from 
the upper bound estimates in Box 36, this would mean that from 2012 to 2028 (assuming CETA 
goes into effect in 2012), Canada might expect around 43 CETA ISDS cases from the EU, the 
successful of which might cost $197 million in combined damages and legal costs. Overall, 
Canada might expect ISDS in CETA to cost it around $CAD 437 total in the 16 years post-
implementation of CETA, which averages to $CAD27.3 million per year. Taking from the 
numbers in Box 36 in section on the EU below, Canada might expect an average initial claim to 
be around $USD 564 million. Canada might even expect more significant numbers herein given 
CETA will liberalise some areas more so than NAFTA, although at the same time the impacts of 
this ‘additional’ liberalisation could be just as well offset by lesser liberalisation in other areas 
                                                             
96 Consultations with DG Trade services trade and investment negotiator in February 2011 
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than that afforded to the US and Mexico under NAFA. The aforementioned figures are obviously 
only rough estimates, meant to provide a general idea of the number of cases and level of 
damages and legal fees Canada might expect under ISDS in CETA and can be adjusted in level of 
magnitude from there given a number of considerations. As mentioned in the below section for 
the EU, the frequency with which intra-EU ISDS cases have been brought and the sizeable claims 
in those cases indicate that it is not unreasonable to compare the level of litigiousness in the EU 
with that in the US. 
 
Box 36: Can an investor from any country sue Canada under CETA? 
 
NAFTA allows for companies of any nationality incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a 
Chapter 11 case. For example, this implies that an EU company incorporated in Canada can 
already bring a case against Canada under Chapter 11. This allowance does not appear, at least 
judging from the names of the complainant’s in Chapter 11 cases, to have been used thus far. 
This could be for any number of reasons, most likely of which is that investors are unaware this 
mechanism exists.  
 
Still, including this allowance in CETA creates a sizeable risk of investor-state litigation against 
Canada. While on one hand the existence of this allowance would seem to imply that the impact 
of CETA should be relatively limited, given investors from EU nations (or other third countries) 
already incorporated Canada, the US or Mexico could technically have already brought cases 
against such countries under NAFTA. Still, it is clear that if CETA were to include a similar 
mechanism it at very least would be opening up a significant channel for litigation. Moreover, if 
by including the mechanism in CETA this were to heighten awareness that the same mechanism 
existed in NAFTA, litigation could increase under both NAFTA and CETA rules. 
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 Uncertain. Likely less 
than significant 
*Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as the cost of defending every one of the 28 Chapter 11 investor-
state cases brought against Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the average costs are likely far less and given 
that if the defendant is successful they often are at least partially compensated for their costs). FDI avgs. from 1994-
2009 (data for 2010 unavailable). ++ Based on analysis in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator hereto. **Policy 
space as defined and discussed in the “Policy space” indicator hereto. Sources: NAFTA damage amounts from Sinclair 
(Oct. 2010), Statistics Canada, and sources cited in aforementioned indicators 
 
In conclusion, as shown in Table 69 above, while including ISDS in CETA indeed may create some 
economic benefits it is uncertain that they would be maximised in a sustainable way. (Moreover, 
it is unclear that ISDS would create a net/overall sustainability benefit for Canada.) A careful 
judgement is required in determining if the threat in terms of number and monetary costs of 
including ISDS in CETA would outweigh the economic benefits. On one hand, there is a risk for 
Canada in including ISDS in CETA. On the other hand, when put into a proper context, the 
monetary costs of defending against ISDS cases brought by the EU through CETA will not be as 
significant as certain stakeholders suggest nor will they have a significant impact on investment 
flows. This latter point is reinforced by consultations with Gary Hufbauer of the Institute of 
International Economics in Washington D.C. who suggests that “Given the maturity of both 
Canada and the EU in investment matters, I would subscribe to the view that the investment 
provisions [in CETA] are more like an insurance policy against rare but damaging events. And 
because the adverse events are rare, the impact on investment flows will be quite small.”97 A 
more detailed understanding of the dynamics herein can be ascertained by reading through the 
“Policy space” and “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicators.  
 
EU 
As mentioned in the “Impact on institutional and regulatory environment…” indicator section, it 
is unclear if the experiences of developing countries are a useful proxy for assessing the 
implications on the EU of ISDS under CETA. The EU only contains five “emerging and developing 
countries” as defined by the IMF (Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania). Canada has 
already signed FIPAs with three of these countries (Latvia, Poland, and Romania) (and the 
remainder of its EU MS FIPAs are with some of the less wealthy countries in the EU, i.e. the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and thus ISDS in CETA is not a particularly new 
instrument in dealing with these specific countries. Moreover, the vast majority of EU states are 
developed, some with some of the highest levels of economic development in the world. As 
such, a consideration of ISDS experiences in or otherwise involving developing countries is 
foregone in this analysis. 
There are some incentives in CETA ISDS that could lead to cases being brought against the EU, 
and thus result in damages paid by the EU. Given Canada to date has not signed a 
comprehensive agreement like NAFTA with provisions allowing all Canadian investors to sue EU 
governments, although it does have FIPAs with 6 EU countries, CETA will allow Canadian and 
certain other investors a wider mandate to sue the EU over the policies of its MS.  
The significance of ISDS under current EU BITs in terms of cost and number of investor-state 
cases should be contextualised by a number of factors. First, it must be considered that the EU 
                                                             
97 Consultations with Gary Hufbauer, Institute for International Economics, February 2011 
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has 1,200 BITs already in place, so investor-state provisions are not new to MS. At the same 
time, there remain concerns from different groups over the regulatory structure of BITs as they 
have been instituted in the EU, suggesting that in fact this experience has not been entirely 
positive. Under Article 207(1) of the TFEU, FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial 
policy. The EU now has the exclusive competence to abolish barriers to foreign direct 
investment, whereas previously Member State BITs protected EU investors (market access was 
already an EU competence). Recently, the EC has discouraged individual MS from signing BITs in 
favour of an EU-wide approach to signing investment agreements. 
Other information regarding current EU BITs in terms of cost and number of investor-state cases 
deserves consideration. There have been numerous relevant cases of intra-EU ISDS disputes, 
some of which have led to sizeable damages paid by governments. For example, the Vattenfall 
vs. Germany case, named after the Swedish state-owned power company, was settled with the 
German government in 2010. Although the awards in this case seem to be kept secret, given the 
sizeable sum of the original claim of €1.4 billion plus interest, it could be possible that a 
substantial sum was paid in this case. It should be noted that this case refers to intra-EU ISDS 
rather than ISDS with non-EU countries.  
Importantly, ISDS in CETA would bind the EU in its entirety in a way it has never before 
committed in any ISDS mechanism. These obligations would put an increased burden on the EC, 
particularly when becoming responsible for defending against investor-state cases brought 
against any number of the governments within MS in the EU.  
Who is more litigious in Chapter 11 disputes, the US or Canada? 
Some stakeholders have pointed to the commonly circulated notion that US is the most litigious 
country on earth to infer that the number of cases and size of the claims brought under ISDS in 
CETA would inevitably be less than those brought under NAFTA, as the US would not be a 
signatory to CETA. While it may be the case that the US is particularly litigious at large, this 
assertion and its extension to CETA deserves further analysis.   
Number of Chapter 11 cases (1994-2010): 
The below Figure 8, which measures the total number of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases by country of 
origin since implementation of NAFTA, supports the aforementioned assertion. 67% of Chapter 
11 cases have been brought by US investors, while only 28% of cases have been brought by 
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Figure 8: Chapter 11 cases by country of origin (1994 – 2010) 
 
Source: Cases tallied from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
However, when considered on a per capita basis, Canada in fact is more litigous in Chapter 11 
cases than the US. Per capita, a Canadian investor is 3.9 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 
case than a US investor. And a Canadian investor is 20.1 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 
case than a Mexican investor.98    
Figure 9: Chapter 11 cases per capita by complaintant’s country of origin (1994-2010) 
 




                                                             
98 For simplicity, this assumes roughly the same number of investors per capita in the US, Canada and Mexico. 
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Average claims in Chapter 11 cases (1994-2010): 
In addition to having a higher propensity to bring Chapter 11 cases, Canadian investors are also 
more likely to bring higher value claims than US investors, although not higher than Mexican 
investors. Canadian Chapter 11 claims are on average 2.5 times higher than US claims. And in 
fact Mexico has the highest average claims record out of any NAFTA country; however, this 
result is heavily skewed given the 2009 CANCAR case brought by Mexican investors requests “$2 
billion annually” (considered for this exercise simply as $2 billion), given information is only 
available for this and one other Mexican claim brought to date (Signa SA), and given Mexico has 
only brought three Chapter 11 cases since 1994. 
 
Table 70: Average claim (millions $USD) in Chapter 11 cases by complainant’s country of origin  
(1994-2010) 
Complainant’s 
country of origin 





Notes: Does not include damages awarded to complainants for legal fees. Claims listed in $CAD in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
considered 1:1 with $USD. *2009 CANCAR case brought by Mexican investors requests “2billion annually,” although 
for the purposes of this exercise only $2billion used. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd (2003) claim of “between 
$310 and $664 million” thus avg. cost of $487 used. No amounts available for 2009 Cemex case brought by Mexican 
investors. US claims exclude Peter Pesic case and Georgia Basin Holdings (as well as Scott Ashton Blair and Halchette, 
which apparently involve US investors vs. Mexico), as no data is available on these cases. Source: data compiled from 
Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
By a different comparison, Canadians do not bring claims that are as high on average; however, 
they still remain higher than those brought by the US. Specifically, among Chapter 11 cases 
brought either by Canadian investors vs. the US or US investors vs. Canada, the claims of 
Canadian investors are on average 1.8 times higher than those brought by US investors. 
 
Table 71: Average claim (millions $USD) in Chapter 11 cases brought either by Canadian 
investors vs. US or US investors vs. Canada (1994-2010) 
Complainant’s 
country of origin 




Notes: Does not include damages awarded to complainants for legal fees. Claims listed in $CAD in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
considered 1:1 with $USD. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd (2003) claim of “between $310 and $664 million” 
thus avg. cost of $487 used. US claims exclude Peter Pesic case and Georgia Basin Holdings, as no data available on 
these cases. Source: data compiled from Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
 
In conclusion, the assertion that the impacts of ISDS in CETA would inevitably be less serious 
than under NAFTA because the US would not be a signatory to CETA is seriously misleading. In 
fact, when analysing the data, a Canadian investor is 3.9 times more likely to bring a Chapter 11 
case than a US investor and on average brings Chapter 11 claims that are 2.5 times higher than 
US claims. However, it should also be noted that it does not appear that Canada (or Mexico) has 
won a Chapter 11 case that has resulted in the defendant paying damages, although in some 
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cases they have split the costs of the case with the defendant. Nonetheless, these finding have 
obvious implications for CETA, specifically that the EU should be more wary about Canada 
bringing more investor-state cases than perhaps otherwise assumed. 
There are other issues of concern with ISDS under NAFTA, which could also apply in CETA, that 
appear to be overlooked. As mentioned, NAFTA allows for companies of any nationality 
incorporated in a NAFTA country to bring a Chapter 11 case, and if CETA were to include this 
same allowance it would create a sizeable risk of litigation against EU. For example, a US 
company incorporated in the EU could in theory bring an investor-state case against the EU 
under CETA ISDS. Given the fact that the US is perceived as one of the most litigious country in 
the world, this possibility brings sizeable risk. Moreover, if by including the mechanism in CETA 
this were to heighten awareness that the same mechanism existed in NAFTA, litigation could 
increase under NAFTA and CETA rules. 
Given these findings, as with Canada, a careful balancing act is required in determining if the 
threat in terms of number and monetary costs of including ISDS in CETA would outweigh the 
economic benefits. The table below provides a cost-to-benefit comparison of including ISDS in 
CETA.  
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*Uses the extreme upper bound of $CAD 10 million as the cost of defending every one of the 17 Chapter 11 investor-
state cases brought by Canada since 1994 (this is extreme given the average costs are likely far less and given that if 
the defendant is successful they often are at least partially compensated for their costs) . FDI avgs. from 1994-2009 
(data for 2010 unavailable). ++ Based analysis in the “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicator hereto. **Policy space as 
defined and discussed in the “policy space” indicators hereto. Sources: NAFTA damages from Scott Sinclair (Oct. 
2010), Statistics Canada, and sources cited in aforementioned indicators 
 
In conclusion, as shown in Table 72 above, while including ISDS in CETA indeed may create some 
economic benefits it is uncertain that they would be maximised in a sustainable way. (Moreover, 
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it is unclear that ISDS would create a net/overall sustainability benefit for the EU.) On one hand, 
there is a risk for Canada in including ISDS in CETA. On the other hand, when put into a proper 
context, the monetary costs of defending against ISDS cases brought by the EU through CETA 
will not be as significant as certain stakeholders suggest nor will they have a significant impact 
on investment flows. A more detailed understanding of the dynamics herein can be ascertained 
by reading through the “Policy space” and “FDI and portfolio flows…” indicators. 
 
US and Mexico 
Investor-state provisions in CETA are unlikely to have a significant impact on costs borne by, or 
the number of cases against, either the US or Mexican government. While CETA could 
theoretically increase the damages awarded by the Canadian government to US and Mexican 
companies under NAFTA investor-state provisions given the usage of the ratchet mechanism, as 
discussed in the “Impact on institutional environment” indictor hereto, these situations could be 
limited. Given these factors, it seems unlikely that the damages from any such litigation would 
be particularly significant.  
 
INDICATOR: Impacts on economic policy space   
Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
An Investment Chapter in CETA clearly would create reductions in regulatory flexibility in the EU 
and Canada. These reductions would first be caused by liberalising certain sectors. They would 
be caused by preventing foreign governments from denying national treatment and MFN to 
investors. They would be caused by other requirements that are standard in most trade 
agreements, for example requirements for a minimum standard of treatment, restrictions on 
expropriation, and prohibitions on performance requirements, among other requirements 
depending upon the agreement. CETA may also institute investor-state arbitration to enforce 
these requirements. While all these examples indeed constitute a reduction in regulatory 
flexibility, as explained in the methodology section, the “policy space” indictor in this SIA is 
exclusively used to measure reductions in the ability of governments to make policies that have 
clear economic, social or environmental benefits.  
Some of the aforementioned reductions in regulatory flexibility will contribute to the economic 
benefits discussed under previous indictors in this section, however others may also constitute a 
reduction in economic policy space as it is used in this SIA. However, further analysis would be 
needed in this area in order to create a fuller assessment of these impacts. Particularly when 
considering the extent to which ISDS in CETA might be more liberal than domestic takings laws 
in Canada and the EU in its definition of expropriation, this might have some negative 
implications on economic policy space in the EU and Canada (refer to the “Impact on 
institutional and regulatory environment.” indicator for more on this issue). As mentioned in the 
“…social policy space” indicator in the Social Assessment below, ISDS in CETA may reduce 
economic policy space by putting some limits on otherwise useful capital controls. Regulatory 
reductions on performance requirements may create some risk of reducing economic policy 
space of the type assessed in this SIA, although, again, without a more thorough assessment 
herein, which is outside the scope of this SIA, this is unclear (the discussion on offsets in the 
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Government Procurement section in this SIA sheds light onto some questions that may need to 
be answered before making a fuller assessment herein).  




INDICATOR: Impacts on social policy space (and spill-over effects on other types of policy 
space)  
Canada 
Canadian stakeholders have expressed concern that ISDS under CETA would lead to reductions 
in Canadian policy space. The main concerns of stakeholders are that investor-state provisions 
and their application in ISDS under CETA would threaten policy space by creating regulatory 
chill, reversal and/or undermining of public policies already in practice, and make it difficult to 
reverse failed privatisations. There are also concerns that CETA’s potential liberalisation of 
current investment policy and laws will limit policy space. While one could consider the impacts 
ISDS has had on developing countries in assessing the impacts ISDS in general could have on 
Canada, there are many obvious institutional, regulatory and other differences between 
developing countries and Canada and the EU at large. As such, the following analysis assesses 
the aforementioned stakeholder concerns using a more robust and directly relevant comparison 
– Canada’s experiences under NAFTA. As explained in the methodology section, the “policy 
space” indictor in this SIA is only used to measure reductions in the ability of governments to 
make policies that have clear economic, social or environmental benefits. 
 
Regulatory chill and other reductions of policy space 
 
Stakeholders have expressed concerns that ISDS under CETA will lead to “regulatory chill” or 
other forms of reduced policy space that will have negative impacts on public welfare. 
Regulatory chill as defined in this analysis is a situation where the government does not enact 
new ‘socially desirable’ laws and regulations – i.e. those to improve areas like human rights 
(including human health, safety, and education) and environmental protection – in fear that 
foreign investors may seek compensation under certain legal agreements, like a trade 
agreement, and/or doing so could lead to capital flight.99 The analysis uses this definition as 
opposed to a wider definition of regulatory chill given analysis based on a wider definition would 
stray from an SIA analysis. Some scholars suggest there are generally three types of regulatory 
chill or reduced policy space: (1) proposed regulatory measures may be abandoned or modified 
before they are introduced in the legislative or other rule-making process, (2) proposed 
measures may be abandoned or modified after they are introduced but before they are 
adopted, and (3) measures may be abandoned or modified after they are adopted.100  
 
                                                             
99 For definitions of “regulatory chill,” among other sources see: Cotula, L. (2008). “Reconciling regulatory stability and 
evolution of environmental standards in investment contracts: Towards a rethink of stabilization clauses.” Journal of 
World Energy Law & Business. Oxford Journals. June 2008. 1(2): 158-179.; and Neumayer, E. (2001) “Greening trade 
and investment: environmental protection without protectionism.” Earthscan Publications, London.   
100 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
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It is difficult to comprehensively analyse the extent of regulatory chill caused by a trade 
agreement. Among other reasons, a case does not necessarily have to be brought in order to 
cause a wave of regulatory chill, as the mere existence of investor-state provisions in a trade 
agreement can cause regulatory chill. This said, turning to NAFTA, while it will never be known if 
certain measures in Canada were not enacted in the past because of a chilling effect, it seems 
reasonable that if the chilling effect was significant enough, given Canada’s solid institutions and 
communication mechanisms, as well as an informed population, then government, academics, 
or other stakeholders would have pointed to the most significant and solid examples of 
regulatory chill. Still, and again, there is some uncertainty in this assumption. 
 
Box 37:  Reductions in Canadian policy space caused by Chapter 11:  
A questionnaire 
 
In an effort to add some more clarity to this situation, a questionnaire was distributed in mid 
February 2011 to the Attorney General’s offices in all Canadian provinces and territories, as well 
as to the office at the national level, to assess the impacts of regulatory chill and other forms of 
reduced policy space in Canada caused by NAFTA Chapter 11 and the predicted impact under 
CETA ISDS. The results from one questionnaire, ultimately answered not by the Attorney 
General’s office but the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in Ontario, indicated that 
NAFTA has had a “Non-existent or negligible” impact in terms of regulatory chill and did not 
create any other limits on policymaking and/or policy implementation in Ontario. Also, the same 
results suggest that investor-state provisions if included in CETA will likely have a “Non-existent 
or negligible” impact on policymaking in Ontario. This feedback downplays the importance of 
certain examples of regulatory chill in Ontario cited by some scholars.101 Results from the 
questionnaire sent to New Brunswick provide no rankings on NAFTA’s or CETA’s impact on 
policy space given the stated sensitive nature of the NB Attorney General office’s involvement in 
the CETA negotiations. Feedback from the questionnaire sent to Alberta only suggests that the 
province takes a range of issues into account when making regulations, including Canada’s 
international trade obligations. No other responses were received. 
 
 
Below is a broad and brief overview of NAFTA investor-state challenges that have been claimed 
will or actually have led to regulatory chill or otherwise reduce policy space in Canada. This is 
followed by a summary analysis of what these examples mean for CETA.    
 
Effect on public services/would-be public services 
Auto insurance: Perhaps the most clear-cut example of regulatory chill directly resulting from 
NATA investor-state provisions is where New Brunswick abandoned a public auto insurance 
proposal after threat of a Chapter 11 lawsuit. Sources suggest that Ontario also backed away 
from an automobile insurance plan given the precedent in the New Brunswick case.102 It should 
be noted that regulation of auto insurance may not conventionally be thought of as part of 
‘socially desirable’ regulation and thus the extent to which these instances are considered 
regulatory chill under the definition used in this SIA is debatable.   
                                                             
101 For example, see: Kukucha, C. (2008). The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy. UBC Press, Vancouver. 
2008. 
102 Ibid 
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Postal services: In 2005, concerns were expressed over the UPS Chapter 11 case challenging the 
cross-subsidation of the Canadian Postal Service within the Canadian postal market, which was 
seen by some stakeholders to threaten the monopoly and undermine state regulation in the 
sector.103 However, the case was subsequently dismissed. 
Health: British Columbia requested a clear definition of what social services were committed in 
Annex II (exclusions) of NAFTA, and were assured that “public education, public training, health 
and child care” were included in provisions related to cross-border investment and services.104 
In other words, none of these services fall under the full purview of the NAFTA investor-state 
mechanism. Also for context, there are provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11 to allow companies to 
operate services for public health and education without fear of being sued.105 Also, as 
stipulated by NAFTA Article 1108, Article 1102 does not apply to measures that relate to social 
services such as healthcare (or childcare and social welfare). 
On healthcare specifically, particularly private healthcare, as distinguished from wider ‘health-
related’ measures which are mentioned below, no successful investor-state case has been 
brought against Canada since NAFTA has been enacted. The most recent case on healthcare in 
Canada, Centurion Health Corporation vs. Canada which disputed that the Canada Health Act 
had limited investment opportunities in Canada by monopolising the healthcare market, was 
dismissed on procedural grounds in August 2010.  
Nonetheless, concern exists about the regulatory chill investor-state provisions/ISDS in NAFTA 
may create on health-related regulations. While not solely related to health issues, the 
Government of Canada abandoned a regulation in December 2001 to prohibit the display of 
“light” and “mild” descriptors on tobacco packing after Phillip Morris International protested the 
ban.106 Salazar (2010) suggests that recent NAFTA tribunal decisions confirm that “…a non-
discriminatory regulation that may affect foreign investors’ property rights, but advances a 
public purpose may not constitute expropriation.” 107 In other words, in practice leeway exists in 
policymaking for public purposes under the investor-state provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11, 
particularly Article 1110. However, the same analysis goes on to suggest there are still 
significant uncertainties in Chapter 11 which may cause regulatory chill, particularly in areas 
related to Canada’s pro-healthy eating policies.108  
 Also, as further discussed below, there have been a notable number of environmental cases 
brought under Chapter 11, some of which also touch somewhat upon the issue of public health. 
For example, there is the aforementioned S.D. Myers Inc. case where a US waste disposal 
company sued and won over a temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes. There is also the 
aforementioned 1997 Ethyl Corporation dispute, where the Canadian government settled out of 
                                                             
103 Public Citizen (2005). “NAFTA’s Threat to Sovereignty and Democracy: The Record of NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-
State Cases 1994-2005.” February 2005. http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter%2011%20Report%20Final.pdf 
104 Kukucha, C. (2010). “Provincial Pitfalls: Provinces and the Canada-EU Trade Negotiations.” University of Lethbridge. 
URL: http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Kukucha.pdf 
105 NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1101, sub-article 4. “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or 
insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a 
manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter.” (emphasis added) 
106 Pavey, B. and T. Williams (2003). “The North American Free Trade Agreement: Chapter 11.” Parliamentary 
Research Branch, Library or Parliament of Canada. 26 February 2003.  
107 Salazar, A. V.  (2010). “NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law.” 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 27 (1): 32 
108 Ibid 
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court with the Ethyl Corporation over Canada’s ban on the import and inter-provincial trade of 
the gasoline additive MMT, a suspected neurotoxin. There is the ongoing case, filed in August 
2008, in which Dow Agro Sciences alleges the 2006 Quebec ban on the use of pesticides for 
cosmetic lawn care was imposed without a scientific basis or opportunity for the company to 
prove the pesticides are safe, and that the ban is tantamount to expropriation. 
Education: No investor-state cases regarding education have been brought against Canada to 
date.109 Readily available evidence does not suggest NAFTA has created significant regulatory 
chill on measures promoting education.   
Environment  
There have been a number of environmental cases brought under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. In fact, 
as of a decade after NAFTA was in force, over ¼ of all investor-state disputes involved 
environmentally-related concerns.110 The aforementioned S.D. Myers Inc. and Ethyl Corporation 
cases involved environmental issues. While not only related to environmental issues, some 
observers raise environmental concerns over the August 2010 Abitibi Bowater Inc. out-of-court 
settlement over measures taken by the local government of Newfoundland and Labrador to 
return to the state timber and water usage rights held by the company and expropriate certain 
assets and lands associated with the company’s usage rights.111 Among other issues, the case 
concerns the role of Abitibi Bowater, who was in bankruptcy, in paying to clean up the 
environmental pollution it left at several former properties. These cases are of great concern to 
a variety of stakeholders who are worried they will erode protection of plant, animal and human 
safety.112  
There are a number of ongoing NAFTA investor-state cases that involve environmental issues 
and have raised concerns that they might reduce policy space to the detriment of the 
environment. For example, Bilcon Corporation is suing the Canadian government under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 for over $188 million for rejecting a development project in White Point Quarry, 
which lies along a coastal area near the Bay of Fundy biosphere reserve.  
Capital controls 
Recent studies have expressed concern over the restrictions investor-state provisions can put on 
a government’s flexibility to institute capital controls. 113 The proper usage of capital controls 
has wide-ranging implications in terms of maintaining the macroeconomic health of an 
economy, which in turn has implications on controlling inflation, curtailing wage inequality, 




                                                             
109 Review of cases as listed in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
110 Hufbauer and Schott (2005)   
111 Sinclair (Oct. 2010) at pg 25 suggests “…the Abitibi Bowater settlement entails an open-ended, excessive conception 
of property rights that goes well beyond reasonable protections and domestic legal norms…Whenever natural 
resource concessions are revised or revoked, however legitimate the government’s reasons, investors can now be 
expected to invoke NAFTA’s Chapter 11.”  
112 Among others, see The Council of Canadians. “NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state dispute process: New challenges 
to Canadian environmental and health policy call NAFTA into question.” 
113 Gallagher, K. (2010) 
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Box: 38 Frequency of cases citing the expropriation provision and breadth 
of expropriation protections 
 
It is important to note that not all investor-state brought against Canada under NAFTA to date 
were based on the particularly controversial expropriation clause, although 79% were. For 
example, while the expropriation aspect of NAFTA cases often receives the most publicity, 6 
cases out of the 28 NAFTA cases brought to date – United Parcel Service of America Inc. (2000); 
Trammel Crow Co. (2001); Peter Pesic (2005); Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. & Murphy Oil 
Corporation (2007); Bilcon Inc. (2008); and Centurion Health Corporation (2008) – 21%, do not 
invoke the expropriation provision in Chapter 11.114  Half of these cases were already mentioned 
in this “Policy space” indicator as being of concern to stakeholders, and the Mobil case, which 
has not been mentioned thus far, is also of concern to some. Of these cases the Bilcon and Mobil 
cases are still under review and the others have ended without known damages.  
 
The frequency of the usage of expropriation clauses, when considered alongside the principle 
that the allowances for cases on expropriation under NAFTA are wider than those under 
domestic Canadian law, produces a stronger force to reduce policy space. Still, there is not 
persuasive evidence that this will necessarily result in reductions of policy space considered 
relevant to this SIA. The significance of the expropriation flexibility in particular is uncertain 
given the relatively limited NAFTA jurisprudence on the issue. On one hand, one could suggest 
the limited jurisprudence on the subject allows for the possibility that this allowance is a 
relatively minor issue; however, many cases in NAFTA are still undecided (i.e. 15 or 20 
depending on one what information one consults as to the state of such cases). Also, there does 
not seem to be much utility, let alone equity, in allowing foreign investors to bring cases 
regarding expropriation in way not allowed to domestic investors.  
 
Given the lack of clear implications of these issues under NAFTA precedent, there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that under CETA they will have clear impacts on policy space that will be of 
significance. Still, they are cause for concern.  
 
 
In addition to the aforementioned examples, which focus largely on regulatory chill concerns, 
certain sources infer that allowing ISDS like that in NAFTA in an agreement could actually lead to 
reversal and/or undermining of public policies currently in practice and this would have negative 
impacts on public welfare.115 For example, stakeholders suggest some NAFTA cases have indeed 
undermined currently in force domestic and international laws.116 Without a rigorous legal 
analysis it is not possible to fully assess the extent of these claims. 
                                                             
114 Review of cases in Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
115 Public Citizen (2005) 
116 For example, respectively referencing the S.D. Meyers (1998) and Pope & Talbot (1998) cases under NAFTA 
Chapter 11 against Canada, Public Citizen (2005) finds “…the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and the U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement, were both successfully 
challenged using NAFTA investor-state system and damages were awarded in both cases.”   
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Difficulty in reversing ‘failed’ privatisations 
As discussed in the government procurement section, investor-state provisions in CETA could 
conceivably discourage private services (including those that were formerly public and then 
made private) from being made public. Stakeholders have expressed particular concern that 
failed privatisations might not easily be remedied by making such services public for fear of 
investor-state litigation. Examples are cited where investor-state provisions have made 
reversing failed privatisations costly.117  
However, these trends should be put into context. To the extent these concerns arise from the 
protection against expropriation allowed in CETA, domestic takings laws require compensation 
for typical forms of expropriation anyway (as discussed in the “Impact on the institutional and 
regulatory environment…” indicator). In other words, a lawsuit on expropriation issues could be 
brought, and can already be brought, in domestic courts without CETA investor-state provisions, 
with some rather rare exceptions as discussed in the “Impact on the institutional and regulatory 
environment…” indicator and again mentioned in the above Box 38. Also, it should be 
recognised that the government retains the right to act in what it considers the public interest, 
for example in nationalising failed private services, although if it loses an investor-state case it 
may have to pay compensation.  
Regarding the latter example on nationalising failed privately delivered services, the below Box 
39 briefly considers if investor-state provisions in CETA could make it more difficult to 
nationalise certain services, and includes a mention of water delivery and management services 
which were not covered in NAFTA in the same way stakeholders suggest they may be in CETA. It 
should be stressed that the impact of nationalisation, privatisation, and the difficulties that 
implementing either one has on the actual end quality of public services, which is a major focus 
of privatisations in addition to controlling the costs to government of otherwise providing such 
services, deserves an analysis of its own which is outside the scope of this SIA. 
 
 Box 39: Will investor-state provisions in CETA make it more difficult to 
nationalise certain services? 
 
Certain provisions in CETA on services and investment may compound the indirect, long-term 
trends towards forms of privatisation of certain services that are not currently as competitive as 
they would be with CETA as mentioned in the “Quality of goods and services” indicator in the 
Government Procurement section; however, it is unclear to exactly what extent this will make it 
more difficult to reverse failed privatisations in Canada or the EU. Stakeholders warn that CETA 
will in part push privatisation through a ban equity caps, performance requirements and certain 
other services-related provisions that will ultimately be locked in law and protected with a 
dispute resolution system, including via investor-state provisions.  
Indeed, certain services could be subject to investor-state cases under CETA; however they must 
first meet some criteria (again, assuming the functioning of the Investment Chapter in CETA will 
be structured similar to NAFTA). For example, they should not be directly related to government 
                                                             
117 See examples in, among others: Sinclair (Oct. 2010) 
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procurement. They should be actually committed in CETA and legally susceptible to investor-
state provisions (i.e. they are not excluded by sectoral, 118 reciprocal and investment review 
reservations). To single out the expropriation clause within investor-state provisions, the 
government would actually have to want to nationalise/further nationalise a service that is 
private in some form (for a discussion on forms of nationalisation and privatisation see the box 
on privatisation in the “Quality of goods and services” indicator in the Government Procurement 
section). Lastly, and obviously, an investor-state case would actually also have to be brought. 
Herein, how and why an investor-state case could challenge a nationalisation plan requires 
further analysis. The investor obviously needs to meet the legal requirements for bringing a case 
against a nationalisation. But also, the rationales behind investors bringing a case and the 
approaches/forms of nationalisation the government attempts to institute also requires further 
consideration. Specifically, what form of nationalisation is sought and what state of privatisation 
the target service provider is in will be a factor in determining if cases are even considered in the 
first place. 
Additionally, and as alluded to under this indicator, it is unclear to what degree the threat of a 
case, or even a formally lodged case, with or without a win, would cause regulatory chill or other 
regulatory pressures that would complicate or actually prevent a nationalisation plan. And 
without this certainly there is uncertainty in how difficult it would be to actually nationalise 
certain services.  
As such, the aforementioned limitations combined with the analysis on NAFTA precedent (i.e. 
only on the results of cases brought to date) suggest that it will not necessarily be as difficult to 
nationalise certain services under CETA as certain stakeholders seem to suggest. However, this 
certainly does not mean it will be easy, nor in certain cases without investor-state challenges 
which will cost money and may indeed derail such efforts. Also, this conclusion is based on 
evidence of the results of past NAFTA cases and many cases are still pending. Further, even if 
governments do not attempt to nationalise ‘failed privatisations’ this should not necessarily 
detract from certain stakeholders’ views that privatisations may result in certain negative 
impacts.  
This issue warrants further study. For example, privatisation of water services, which were not 
covered in NAFTA in the same way stakeholders suggest they may be in CETA, has been 
recorded to have mixed impacts depending on the circumstances.119 In fact, there is a notable 




Liberalising current investment policy and laws 
In addition to the impacts on the regulatory system caused by potential investor-state 
provisions in CETA, stakeholders have different views on CETA’s overall impact (not only limited 
to ISDS) in terms of liberalising and binding liberalisation of certain Canadian laws. Some 
stakeholders are concerned that CETA may directly liberalise and bind liberalisation of Canada’s 
investment requirements and this would in turn limit Canadian policy space. For example, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
118 Note: Canada carried over 48 sectoral reservations from CUFSTA under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Hufbauer and Schott 
(2005), pg 202.) 
119 Among others see: Gleick et al. (2002)  
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Canada may reduce the equity cap on foreign investment in the telecom industry as a result of 
CETA. On the other hand, other stakeholders suggest more competition resulting from telecom 
liberalisation in particular is better for Canadian consumers as they pay notably more for their 
telecommunication services than do consumers in the EU. 
At a surface level, this obviously would limit the government’s flexibility in economic 
policymaking as previous investment restrictions would no longer be allowable; however this in 
itself does not indicate it would reduce the type of ‘policy space’ that is relevant to this SIA. An 
in-depth assessment of all of Canada’s investment rules that may be liberalised within CETA, 
their utility in policymaking, and an assessment of related results would be needed to fully 
assess positive and negative consequences herein.  
Conclusion 
The full effects in terms of regulatory chill from undecided NAFTA investor-state cases has yet to 
be assessed, and thus it is difficult to use these examples in a way that might specifically predict 
the impacts of similar provisions in CETA – nonetheless, some conclusions can be made. 
Although certainly creating some limitation on policy space there does not appear to be 
sufficient evidence to suggest investor-state claims under NAFTA to date have significantly 
undermined Canada’s domestic rules for health/safety or education, nor substantially inhibited 
Canada’s ability to propose and implement essential environmental regulations (see 
Environmental Assessment below). Consultations to date with Canadian government regulators, 
albeit limited to Ontario (other government consultations did not produce direct answers), 
support this. And for context, there are provisions in NAFTA (and the GATT) that stipulate the 
agreement should not prevent enactment of certain justifiable measures to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health,120 which may have contributed somewhat indirectly to this 
outcome.   
This assessment is based on imperfect information and there is some information that suggests 
that NAFTA has created what could be defined as regulatory chill and other reductions in policy 
space. Clear examples of regulatory chill as defined by some include abandonment of an auto 
insurance plan in New Brunswick and Ontario, as well as abandoning a plan on packaging on 
cigarettes. Although 3 of the 4 successful Chapter 11 cases against Canada involved regulatory 
inflexibility that should not be blamed solely on NAFTA but also on unrelated difficulties in 
domestic policymaking, they also could have somewhat reduced policy space via challenging 
bans on MMT, export quotas on lumber, and a temporary ban of toxic PCB wastes. Some 
continue to predict dire consequences for provincial and local regulatory authorities as a result 
of NAFTA ISDS, pointing to the 4th successful Chapter 11 case, Abitibi Bowater, and pending 
cases including the Dow Agrosciences and Bilcon case, among others. Further, there could be 
other forms of regulatory chill that have resulted from ISDS in NAFTA, although their regulatory 
significance is unclear, which compound the level of significance of such instances. 
It is important to again stress that a reduction in policy space as it is sometimes defined by 
stakeholders is not necessarily negative, and thus it is essential to fully consider in detail the 
actual significance of the aforementioned initiatives as impacting the policy space indicator as 
defined in this SIA. While considering this, some, for example Public Citizen (2005), go to 
                                                             
120 See footnotes on related point in “Quality of goods and services” indicator and baseline for the Environmental 
Assessment in Government Procurement section. 
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extremes in criticising ISDS in NAFTA specifically. Others, while less extreme still find that 
available evidence from NAFTA suggests that ISDS may “lead to reductions in policy space and 
that those reductions are significant in light of the risk of large awards and the general cost to 
the public of failures or omissions to regulate in areas of public health and environmental 
protection and the delivery of public services. In the absence of further study, it is not possible 
to rule out this troubling outcome.”121 This analysis disagrees with these levels of wariness over 
ISDS in NAFTA, and thus ISDS in CETA, for the reasons mentioned below, although also as 
mentioned below agrees with a need for wariness of ISDS in CETA (and NAFTA). 
The available evidence does not convincingly suggest that investor-state provision in NAFTA to 
date have created significant reductions of the type of policy space relevant to this SIA. To be 
sure, this conclusion is reached using a reasonable threshold for burden of proof (minding the 
obvious dangers of thresholds that are too low or high), i.e. following the same approach to 
what constitutes a “significant” impact as described in the methodology of this SIA. It considers 
the details of the examples provided in the above section, including via a review of tribunal 
rulings.122 As such, many of the extreme concerns over Chapter 11 seem misleadingly 
overstated, a conclusion also reached by prominent experts on the impacts of NAFTA.123 Many 
of these concerns often continue to be based more on a scenario of ‘what if’ in terms of past 
and future impacts rather than the available evidence from 16 years of precedent, sometimes 
draw upon the questionably relevant experiences of developing countries, and appear to 
undervalue the nuanced sustainability implications of ISDS discussed in other indicators hereto.  
Nonetheless, this analysis errs on the side of caution by concluding ISDS in NAFTA likely has 
created and will continue to create some reductions in policy space, i.e. policy space as relevant 
to this SIA, in Canada which may have negative impacts on social sustainability. This conclusion 
has implications for CETA. 
The policy reductions caused by ISDS allowances under CETA would likely be less significant than 
foreseen by some observers, but not necessarily insignificant and could indeed have negative 
impacts on social policy space. They might be on the magnitude of minor to notable. As stated, 
this opinion was reached after a careful weighing of relevant available evidence and erring on 
                                                             
121 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
122 Primary sources on all cases: http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada.htm. For information on the 4 cases in 
particular: 
(1) For  S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada (partial award, Nov. 2000) main opinion 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAward.pdf, separate concurring opinion at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAwardOpinion.pdf 
(2) The final decision on Ethyl Corporation vs. Canada was kept secret although there are 1998 opinions available on 
place of arbitration, jurisdiction, and confidentiality: http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada_ethyl.htm 
(3) For Pope & Talbot Inc. vs. Canada  (final award on merits, April 2001) 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeInterimMeritsAward.pdf) 
(4) The final decision on Abitibi Bowater vs. Canada appears to be kept secret per request of one or both of the 
parties. No notice of confidentiality appears to be available. Information on notice of intent and arbitration at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/disputes_canada_abitibi.htm. Limited information is available on the final ruling, although 
some is available at sources such as Sinclair (Oct. 2010), and Best, C. (2010). “The Federal Government Settles 
AbitibiBowater’s NAFTA Claim.”  The Court.ca, August 27, 2010. 
123 This same general conclusion was made by Hufbauer and Schott (2005) at pg 249, although not necessarily for all 
the same reasons provided herein and it should be note that their book was also published before the 2010 Abitibi 
Bowater decision. Additionally, in consultations with Gary Hufbauer, Institute for International Economics, February 
2011, he warns of overemphasising the value of discriminatory practices meant to upkeep an often abstract concept 
of policy space, citing that these are dimensions of policy space (as it is often vaguely defined) that trade and 
investment agreements like CETA seek to limit. 
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the side of caution for following reasons: (1) the seeming lack of utility in using investor-state 
arbitration panels between the EU and Canada, who have some of the most advanced legal 
systems in the world combined with the shortcomings of ISDS tribunals as currently operating; 
(2) the potential pressure that the number of investor-state cases and costs in terms of damages 
and legal fees may have had and continue to create in terms of regulatory chill; (3) the likelihood 
of the existence of unrecorded regulatory chill and other impacts reducing policy space that may 
have some negative impacts; (4) given there is some indication that ISDS cases under NAFTA and 
EU BITs have lead to reductions in policy space, and this is only part of the picture as Chapter 11 
legal opinions are publicly available for only 50% of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases against Canada 
ending in payment of damages and limited information is also available on EU ISDS cases; and 
(5) given that including a provision allowing companies of any nationality incorporated in a CETA 
country to bring an investor-state case would compound these concerns.  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for 
concern that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant social policy space in Canada. And as such, it 




It is clear that the EC has been meeting some difficulties recently in ensuring that its policy 
objectives are met with regards to BITs. The EC has stated “EU investment policy has to be 
consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on the 
protection of the environment, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural 
diversity, development policy and competition policy.”124 Yet there remain concerns from 
different groups over the regulatory structure of BITs as they have been instituted in the EU, 
suggesting that in fact this experience has not been entirely positive. Under Article 207(1) of the 
TFEU, FDI now falls within the scope of EU commercial policy. The EU now has the exclusive 
competence to abolish barriers to foreign direct investment, whereas previously Member State 
BITs protected EU investors (market access was already an EU competence). Recently, the EC 
has discouraged individual MS from signing BITs in favour of an EU-wide approach to signing 
investment agreements. 
The significance of ISDS under current EU BITs in terms of threats to policy space as defined in 
this SIA should be contextualised by a number of factors. On one hand, it must be considered 
that the EU has 1,200 BITs already in place, so investor-state provisions are not new to MS. On 
the other hand, many of these BITs are between certain MS and third countries that are 
developing and are not particularly litigious. There have been at least 35 known cases already 
brought against EU states, although as there is little publicly available information on many of 
these cases it is difficult to measure the policy impacts therein.  
Although the aforementioned findings provide general uncertainty as to the impacts of ISDS on 
EU policy space, when taken together with details of trends in ISDS against MS that are 
available, they provide a real concern that ISDS will reduce policy space in the EU. In recent 
years there has been concern over the application of intra-EU BITs in particular. For example, 
the EC has expressed concerns over a number of cases, for example in the Eureko v. Slovakia 
arbitration, Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, AES v. Hungary, and Electrabel v. Hungary cases. 
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Some conclude concerns over these cases may reflect that intra-EU BITs serve as “a source of 
inequality between EU citizens as well as a hindrance to the harmonized development of EC 
law.”125 The Vattenfall claim, named after the state-owned Swedish power company, involves a 
decision by the Hamburg city council in Germany and has generated a notable amount of press 
attention.126 Some note that the Vattenfall case concerns a range of health, climate change and 
conservation concerns, and will likely raise concerns over regulatory chill among local decision 
makers in Germany.127 While it is still not fully clear to what extent these trends should be 
extrapolated to EU-wide BITs with a foreign nation like Canada, they do provide relevant 
experiences that are cause for at least some concern. 
The aforementioned potential reductions in policy space in the EU resulting from current ISDS 
will likely be compounded in CETA given that current investment agreements do not bind the EU 
in its entirety as would investor-state provisions in CETA. Since the EU as a whole has not 
included investor-state provisions in its EU-wide trade and investment agreements it will take 
some time for the EU to adjust to investor-sate cases arising from CETA. Although Canada 
already has FIPAs with 6 EU countries, CETA will provide Canadian (and certain other investors if 
the ‘third countries incorporation’ provision is included in CETA) a wider mandate to sue the 
EU’s oversight institution over the policies of its individual MS. These obligations would put an 
increased burden on the EC by becoming responsible for defending against investor-state cases 
brought against any number of the governments within MS in the EU.  
In conclusion, the EU could experience limits on policy space from investor-state provisions in 
CETA that will have negative impacts on social sustainability. These limits could be on the 
magnitude of minor to notable. The rationale herein follows the same rationale in the Canada 
section, i.e. is based upon consideration of the (1) questionable utility of using ISDS as currently 
operating rather than domestic courts in the EU, (2) precedent of ISDS creating some regulatory 
chill, (3) risk of unrecorded regulatory chill from ISDS, (4) lack of information on ISDS case 
rulings, and (5) risk created by a ‘third country incorporation’ provision in ISDS in CETA. While 
the significance of ISDS cases under CETA may not be of the magnitude as that experienced 
under NAFTA to date, it is reasonable to suggest that CETA will likewise produce reductions of 
policy space. Further, at a minimum, it appears that CETA would reduce policy space in a way 
that would burden an EC that is at present struggling to steer the ISDS tendencies of its MS onto 
the right track. And this risk would be compounded by the propensity of Canada to bring 
investor-state cases, which counter to conventional belief is in fact noteworthy when dealing 
with a developed competitor like the EU (see “Cost of investor-state provisions…” indicator).  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for 
concern that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant social policy space in the EU. And as such, it 




                                                             
125 Von Krause, C. (2010). “The European Commission’s Opposition to Intra-EU BITs and Its Impact on Investment 
Arbitration.”  Kluwer Law International. http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2010/the-european-
commission%e2%80%99s-opposition-to-intra-eu-bits-and-its-impact-on-investment-arbitration/ 
126 Bryant, C.  (2009). “Germany faces action over power plant.” Financial Times. April 2, 2009. 
127 Consultations with Gus Van Harten, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, February 2011 
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US and Mexico 
Investment provisions in CETA are not likely to have notable effects on policy space in the US 
and Mexico. This said, it is not fully clear if the inclusion of a ‘third country incorporation’ 
provision in CETA might impact policy space in the US or Mexico.  
 
INDICATOR: Inequality in wages, displacement of workers, decency and quality of work, 
knock-on effects in innovation 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Canada, EU, US and Mexico 
The overall social impacts of an Investment Chapter in CETA fundamentally depend on its 
implications for policy space and economic growth. For analysis on related impacts on policy 
space see the “Policy space” indicator above.  
The specific effects of an Investment Chapter in CETA on employment and wage inequality are 
mixed. Theoretically, when combined with other provisions of CETA, investment provisions in 
CETA could encourage some labour market frictions with employment shifts among sectors and 
wage inequality among workers.128 However, trade and investment effects together would 
create this effect, and an Investment Chapter in CETA would likely have little impact on its own. 
The extent of shifts depends on the level of liberalisation in CETA. These negative effects could 
be at least somewhat offset by the positive effects mentioned below.  
There may be some positive impacts from investment encouraged under CETA; however, these 
impacts would most likely be realised when combining the impacts the Investment Chapter in 
CETA might have on stimulating investment with the number of other provisions in CETA, for 
example, those on labour mobility, free circulation of goods, competition policy, IPR, 
government procurement, trade facilitation, provisions liberalising restrictions in services 
(inclusive of those indirectly related to investment), and tariff reductions. Investment may be 
channelled into certain industries that benefit human health (and the environment), for 
example green technology. Investment also would likely be channelled into job creation overall, 
some of which may simply make-up for job loss in other areas but nonetheless could be 
concentrated in industries that have higher scores on certain decency of quality work indicators.  
For more on the social impacts caused by CETA-encouraged investment refer to the sectoral 







                                                             
128 For example, for discussion of related impacts from NAFTA see Hornbeck (2004). 
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
INDICATOR: Biodiversity, water usage and contamination, toxic contaminants and effluents, 
air pollution and GHG emissions 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Mining 
Energy is the fastest growing sector for investment in Canada, with $87 billion in 2006, up from 
$30 billion in the late 90s. In 2006 it represented 20% of total inward FDI. The reason for this can 
be seen in the rising cost of oil and the dramatic growth in oil sands production in Alberta. 
Mining is also a fast rising target for investment, totalling 8.7% of inward FDI in 2006. Growth in 
mining and oil and gas extraction decreased in 2009, after successive years of growth. The 
average of the five-year growth rate was 15.2%. Oil and gas extraction rose 2.7% in 2008 to 
reach $78.8 billion, representing 14.4% of all industries. Mining’s growth rate decreased to 0.6% 
in 2009, representing $25.4 billion. The stock invested by the UK in mining and energy dropped 
$4.4 billion.129 
As mentioned in the Industrial Products section, if CETA increased FDI in the oil sands and 
mining sectors this could lead to increased environmental impacts since these sectors are 
environmentally intensive. Given the relative concentration of FDI inflows in these sectors in 
Canada, a marginal increase in investment inflows driven by CETA and higher oil and mineral 
prices could lead to an increase in production capacity that would in turn lead to impacts on 
capital stocks, use of bio diverse areas, water use and contamination, toxic contaminants and 
effluents, and air pollution and GHG emissions. This said, although the gravity modelling for this 
report provides some indication that investment could increase, it is unclear how much CETA 
would increase investment in the oil sands and mining sectors.  
A full analysis of these potential impacts is available in the “Industrial Products” section.  
Other sub-sectors 
According to FDI gravity modelling performed for the study, increased investment might 
gravitate more towards sectors like transportation services and fisheries if barriers in these 
relatively protected sectors are reduced under CETA. Increased investment in the maritime 
transportation services could somewhat neutralise some polluting effects realised in other 
transportation services, for example via land transport. Increased investment in the fisheries 
sector could put some further stress on fish stocks, although feedback from stakeholders 
suggests Canada in particular has a strong record on sustainable fishing and is committed to 
maintaining such a record under CETA.130    




                                                             
129 Government of Canada Statistics (2010). http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-
economiste/performance/state-point/state_2010_point/2010_6.aspx?lang=eng 
130 Feedback from Patrick McGuiness, Fisheries Council of Canada, 1 April 2011 
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INDICATOR: Environmental policy space, institutional and regulatory environment 
BASELINE & ANALYSIS 
Depending on its provisions, and as mentioned, CETA could also impact indicators such as 
environmental policy space and institutional and regulatory environments. Under NAFTA, the 
introduction of investor-state provisions to protect investment led to widely publicised investor-
state disputes. As mentioned in the “Policy space” indicator in the Social Assessment section, as 
of a decade after NAFTA was in force over ¼ of all investor-state disputes involved 
environmentally-related concerns.131 The broad interpretation of NAFTA’s investor-state 
provisions, combined with a panel process that was perceived as lacking transparency, as well as 
concerns about the lack of independence, public accountability, fairness, and participation of 
such processes led to much criticism from both public servants and civil society, and continues 
to receive criticism. Some argued, and some continue to argue, that NAFTA’s Chapter 11 
provisions on investment create a regulatory chill that prevents the introduction of new 
environmental regulations. 
The available evidence does not convincingly suggest that investor-state provisions in NAFTA to 
date have created significant reductions of the type of environmental policy space relevant to 
this SIA. Both the EU and Canada have concluded numerous bilateral and regional investment 
agreements in the past 16 or so years after NAFTA, and their regulatory frameworks have 
proven adaptable and robust enough to prevent a significant decrease in policy space and an 
erosion of their environmental regulatory frameworks.132 Furthermore, the chilling effect on the 
introduction of new domestic regulations subsequent to NAFTA does not appear to be 
significant after 16 or so years as provinces and federal government have continued introducing 
environmental regulations. For these reasons, unless CETA would introduce provisions that 
move away from current EU or Canadian practice, it will likely not have significant 
environmental policy impacts. 
This said, this analysis still errs on the side of caution by concluding, while not meeting the 
threshold of ‘significant,’ ISDS in NAFTA, as well as EU BITs, may very well have created and will 
continue to create some magnitude of reductions in environmental policy space relevant to this 
SIA, and thus ISDS in CETA may have some negative environmental impacts on the EU and 
Canada. In other words, the environmental policy reductions caused by ISDS allowances under 
CETA would likely be less significant than foreseen by some, but not necessarily insignificant. 
The rationale for this conclusion is based on the findings under this indicator as well as the 
rationale in the “Policy space” indicator in the Social Assessment. The potential for specific 
investor-state challenges to stall legitimate regulatory action is real and as such should be 
closely monitored.  For instance, the impacts of the recent Abitibi Bowater case and ongoing 
investor-state cases related to the environment should be monitored closely to the extent they 
                                                             
131 Hufbauer and Schott (2005) 
132 Among other sources describing the impact of investor-state provisions in NAFTA on the environment see Gaines, 
S. E.  (2006). “Environmental Policy Implications of Investor-State Arbitration.” Third North American Symposium on 
Assessing the Environmental Effects of Trade, Montreal, 30 November – 1 December 05. CEC. February 2006. For 
example, pg 36 of that report finds: “What was surprising, even in retrospect, is that such a high proportion of the 
early Chapter 11 arbitrations concerned environmental measures. This high proportion led to reasonable concerns 
among environmental policy makers and advocates that Chapter 11 could have a broad constraining effect on 
governments considering new environmental restrictions on economic activity. This reasonable concern, however, 
has become exaggerated through claims of casual or partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous 
information about the nature of the compensation claims being made, the factual background, or the legal grounds 
on which compensation was paid or awarded...” 
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may show gradual erosion of environmental protections. As a note, some stakeholders have 
expressed concerns on the potential impact of investor-state provisions on the future ability of 
Canada to curtail greenhouse gas emissions in the Alberta oil sands.133  
Taken individually, and especially when taken together, these issues provide a solid reason for 
concern that ISDS in CETA may reduce SIA-relevant environmental policy space in the EU. And as 
such, it is doubtful that including ISDS in CETA would create a net/overall environmental 
sustainability benefit for the EU and/or Canada. 
 
For further analysis on CETA’s impact on policy space, which is not limited to environmental 
policy space, see the “Policy space” indicator in the social assessment section. 
 
7.3.2. OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES  
 
BASELINE 
The EU and Canada have a number of key trade and economic agreements with foreign 
countries. Additionally, it appears that Canada has concluded or is still working on 35 FIPAs with 
other countries. These FIPAs are listed below. EU MS collectively have 1,200 BITs with foreign 
countries, and thus are too extensive to list in this section. 
 
Table 73: Multilateral trade and economic agreements and negotiations for the EU and 
Canada 
Type of Agreement EU Canada 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (1994): US and Mexico 
FTA  
European FTA (2009): Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland 
Colombia and Peru Andean Community Countries: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Peru 
GCC Caribbean Community: Antigua 
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Central America Central America: El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
FTA Negotiations 
ASEAN134 Free Trade Area of the Americas: 
                                                             
133 Shrybman, S. (Nov. 2010). “Potential Impacts of the Proposed Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) on the Pace and Character of Oil Sands Development: A Legal opinion.” Council of 
Canadians, et al. November 2010. 
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CARIFORUM states (2008): 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Saint Christopher 
and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago 
 
EAC: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
 
ESA: Comoros, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe 
 
Pacific: Papua New Guinea, Fiji  
EPAs under negotiation 




MERCOSUR (1998) Trade and Investment 
Cooperation Agreement 
 
Andean Community (1999) 
Source: adapted directly from chart compiled in EU-Canada SIA Inception Report (2010) 
 
Table 74: Bilateral trade and economic agreements and negotiations for the EU and Canada 
Type of Agreement EU Canada 
Faroe Islands (1997)  Israel FTA (1997) 
Norway (1973)  Chile FTA (1997) 
Iceland (1973) Costa Rica FTA (2002) 
Switzerland (1973) Colombia FTA (2008) 
Croatia (2005) Peru FTA (2009) 
Albania (2006) 
Montenegro (2008) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008) 





 Mexico (1997) 
Jordan FTA (2009) 
Ukraine  Ukraine   
Morocco Morocco   
Korea Korea  
Egypt Dominican Republic   
India India   
FTA Negotiations 
Singapore Singapore   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
134 March 2009 the Joint Committee agreed to “take a pause” in the regional negotiations 
135 Negotiations on hold between 2004 and 2009 but restarted in 2010 
























Palestinian Authority (1999) 
Trade, Development and Co-
operation Agreement 
South Africa (2000) South Africa (1998) 
Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
 Australia (1995) 
Ivory Coast (2009) Interim Economic Partnership 












Kazakhstan (Agreement on trade 
in certain steel products) 
 Other Negotiations 
Vietnam (trade in textile and 
clothing products) 
 
Source: adapted directly from chart compiled in EU-Canada SIA Inception Report (2010) 
 
Table 75: Canadian Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs) 
Partner Country  for Canadian FIPAs  In force date/status 




Madagascar Negotiations concluded 
Vietnam Pending 
Mongolia Pending 
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India Pending 
China Pending 
Jordan 14 Dec 2009 
Kuwait Pending 
Peru 20 June 2007 
Croatia 30 January 2001 
Costa Rica 29 September 1999 
Lebanon 19 June 1999 
Uruguay 2 June 1999 
El Salvador Signed 31 May 1999 
Armenia 29 March 1999 
Thailand 24 September 1998 
Panama 13 February 1998 
Venezuela 28 January 1998 
Egypt 3 November 1997 
Ecuador 6 June 1997 
Romania 11 February 1997 
Barbados 17 January 1997 
Philippines 13 November 1996 
Trinidad and Tobago 8 July 1996 
South Africa 27 November 1995 
Latvia 27 July 1995 
Ukraine 24 July 1995 
Hungary 21 November 1993 
Argentina 29 April 1993 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 9 March 1992 
USSR 27 June 1991 
Poland 22 November 1009 
Source: adapted directly from DFIAT “Negotiations and Agreements”136  
 
ANALYSIS 
CETA-inspired investment reforms in Canada in particular (given its higher restrictiveness to 
investment than the EU as measured by the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index) may also have 
minor spill-over effects, making Canada more attractive to FDI from a variety of third (non-EU 
MS) countries. This might occur if the reforms do not provide access solely to EU firms and go 
beyond investment provisions in Canada’s FIPAs and other investment-related agreements. 
Although the effects tied to an Investment Chapter in CETA alone will likely be less than 
                                                             
136 DFIAT. “Negotiations and Agreements.” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx 
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significant, when combined with other provisions of CETA – for example those on labour 
mobility, free circulation of goods, competition policy, and trade facilitation – these effects may 
be more significant. 
 
 
 
